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TAKING GROUNDWATER
DAVE OWEN*
ABSTRACT

In February 2012, in a case called Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day,
the Texas Supreme Court held that landowners hold property rights to the
groundwater beneath their land and that a regulatory restriction on
groundwater use could constitute a taking of private property. The
decision provoked strong reactions, both positive and negative,
throughout the world of water law, for it signaled the possibility of severe
restrictions on groundwater use regulation.
This Article considers the deeper issue that confronted the Texas
Supreme Court, and that has confronted other courts across the country:
how should the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and parallel
clauses of state constitutions, apply to groundwater use regulation?
Initially, this Article explains why this issue is exceedingly and
increasingly important. It then reviews all of the groundwater/takings
decisions from federal and state courts in the United States. Finally, this
Article considers the implications of foundational property theories for the
application of takings doctrine to groundwater use.
The analysis leads to several key conclusions. Most importantly, it
undermines arguments for granting groundwater use rights and
heightened protection against regulatory limitations. Recently, litigants
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earlier drafts; Laura Underkuffler for guidance at this project's formative stages; participants in the
University of California, Hastings Conference on Litigating Regulatory Takings Claims for thoughts
on an earlier presentation of the ideas in this Article; Helen Lukacs for research assistance; and the
staff of the Washington University Law Review for their editorial assistance.
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and commentators skeptical of government regulatory authority have
widely advanced those arguments. But they find little support in past
groundwater/takings case law, and no property theory justifies adopting
such an approach. That does not mean that groundwater use rights should
not qualify for constitutional protection. Despite some recent arguments to
the contrary, such treatment is grounded in precedent and is entirely
compatible with sensible groundwater management. This Article therefore
concludes that the application of a relatively mainstream version of
takings doctrine, which treats groundwater rights as property but allows
substantial government regulation of groundwater use, is both the most
traditional and the most theoretically justifiable approach.
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INTRODUCTION

Groundwater may be our most underappreciated natural resource. 1 On
an average day, 130 million Americans drink water from a well.2 In many

1. For a technical definition of groundwater, as well as an explanation of what it is and how it
moves, see infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
2.

See AM. GROUND WATER TRUST, PUB. INFO. PAMPHLET No. 10: BACTERIA AND WATER

WELLS, available at http://www.agwt.org/content/bacteria (last visited Dec. 19, 2013); NAT'L
GROUNDWATER ASS'N, GROUNDWATER USE FOR AMERICA (2010), available at http://www.ngwa.org/
Documents/Awareness/usfactsheet.pdf ("43.8% of America's population regularly depends upon
groundwater for its drinking water supply.") (footnote omitted).
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rural areas, no other water source is available. 3 Approximately 40,000
municipal water supply systems depend upon groundwater, as does much
of the bottled water industry.4 Nearly 100,000 American farms depend
upon groundwater, which provides approximately forty-two percent of the
nation's irrigation supplies.5 In some places, groundwater is the
predominant agricultural water source, and in many other areas it is the
most reliable. 6 Groundwater aquifers also recharge many of our surface
waterways, and thus play a critical role in sustaining rivers, lakes,
wetlands, and streams. We generally give groundwater very little thought.
Because it is concealed from view, most people have only vague, and
often inaccurate, conceptions of what groundwater is, where it comes
from, and how it moves. 8 But obscurity does not mean unimportance.
Groundwater plays a central role in our daily lives.
Groundwater also is a source of conflict. Its invisibility begets overuse,
and across the nation, many aquifers 9 are pumped at unsustainable rates.10
Others have been effectively lost to pollution. Fears of groundwater
contamination remain at the center of major public controversies over
natural gas drilling, oil pipelines, and nuclear waste disposal.1 2 Globally,

3. According to the United States Geological Survey, "[a]nestimated 42.9 million people in the
United States . .. supplied their own water for domestic use in 2005 .... Nearly all (98 percent) of
these self-supplied withdrawals were from fresh groundwater." U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005 19 (2009).
4. EPA, FACTOIDS: DRINKING WATER AND GROUND WATER STATISTICS FOR 2009 4 (2009).

The exact number is 40,025, and those systems serve just over 88 million people. Id.
5. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 43; NAT'L GROUNDWATER ASS'N, supra
note 2, at 1. The exact number, based on 2009 data, is 97,690 farms. Id.
6. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HIGH PLAINS REGIONAL GROUND-WATER STUDY 3 (2000)
("Water from the High Plains aquifer is the principal source of supply for irrigated agriculture ....");
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL.
L. 241, 249 n.45 (2000) (providing statistics on the importance of groundwater to rural areas).
7.

See generally THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE

RESOURCE (1998).
8. See Daniel L. Dickerson et al., Groundwater in Science Education, 18 J. SCI. TEACHER
EDUC. 45, 46 (2007) ("[F]ew students or science educators hold complete and appropriate
understandings regarding the concept and apparently do not learn anything about it after high
school."); see also DAVID KEITH TODD & LARRY W. MAYS, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 3-4 (3d ed.
2005) (describing inaccurate theories that philosophers from Aristotle to Descartes offered to explain
the origins of groundwater).
9. An aquifer is a subsurface formation through which groundwater flows, and from which it
can be pumped at economically viable rates. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (describing
groundwater and aquifers in more detail).
10.

See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND-WATER DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION (2003),

available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-03/.
11. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION
consequences of using water from a polluted aquifer).
12.

(1995)

(describing

the terrible

See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., EPA, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF

HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES viii (2011) ("Many concerns about
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aquifers are being depleted-that is, pumped at a rate greater than natural
recharge-by an estimated 145 cubic kilometers per year, a rate high
enough to measurably contribute to sea level rise.13 Such extensive
groundwater use generates tensions among competing users, and it also
carries environmental consequences, including reduced streamflows and
degraded surface water quality. 14 Sometimes groundwater pumping can
literally make rivers disappear. 15
The resulting conflicts implicate basic questions of statutory, common,
and constitutional law. In the United States, most human groundwater use
occurs under some sort of claimed property right, with groundwater users
claiming either ownership interests in the groundwater beneath their land
17
or usufructuary rights 16 to pump groundwater and put it to use.
Consequently, groundwater users often argue that they are protected from
regulation by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
by similar provisions of state constitutional law. 18 In recent litigation, they
have ratcheted up the ambition of their arguments, claiming that
groundwater use rights (or water use rights more generally) should receive
more takings protection than courts traditionally provide to other forms of
property. 19 Yet the case for regulatory control of groundwater use seems
compelling. Most aquifers span property boundaries, and one property20
owner's pumping can compromise or even dry out her neighbors' wells.

hydraulic fracturing center on potential risks to drinking water resources ...."); Paul Hammel,
Pipeline Tweaks Don't Taip Skepticism, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 6, 2012, at 1B; David
Applegate, The Mountain Matters, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE
NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 105, 108-12 (Allison M. Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing
eds., 2006) (describing the uncertain relationship between groundwater flow and the ability of a spent
nuclear fuel repository to contain the waste).
13. See Leonard F. Konikow, Contribution of Global Groundwater Depletion Since 1900 to SeaLevel Rise, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 17401, 17401 (2011).

14. See, e.g., S. Zekster et al., Environmental Impacts of Groundwater Overdraft: Selected Case
Studies in the Southwestern United States, 47 ENvTL. GEOLOGY 396 (2005); see generally WINTER ET
AL., supra note 7. Of the many examples described by Zekster et al., the story of California's
Cosumnes River, which once was a major salmon stream, is particularly stark: "between 8 and 16 km
of the Cosumnes River dry up towards the end of California's dry season ....This decline is the result
of groundwater extraction that has lengthened the period during which rivers in this region feature very
low or negligible flow." Zekster et al., supra, at 400.
15. See, e.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EFFECTS OF WATER WITHDRAWALS ON STREAMFLOW
IN THE IPSWICH RIVER BASIN, MASSACHUSETTS (2001), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-16000/pdf/fsOO16O.pdf; ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF

AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 35-125 (2002) (describing multiple waterways at risk).
16. A usufruct is "[a] right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another's property
without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the property over
time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
18. See infra Part II (describing cases involving such claims).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 136-41 and 209-12.
20. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
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That pumping also can strain ecological systems protected under a wide
variety of environmental laws.21 Consequently, groundwater use routinely
activates the tension between a widely shared desire to protect private
property rights from regulation and an equally widely recognized need to
use regulation to curb problematic uses of property.
As many
commentators have noted, resolving that tension forms one of the central
challenges of American property and constitutional law.23
The inchoate nature of groundwater law exacerbates these tensions.
Most states' groundwater laws evolved when unrestricted pumping was
widely viewed as acceptable or even desirable, and when groundwater
science was too undeveloped to support sophisticated regulatory
schemes. 24 Consequently, landowners generally could pump without any
constraint from competing private users or from public regulators.25 On
paper, at least, the law has evolved beyond its archaic roots. Almost every
state has at some point produced legislation or judicial decisions, or both,
proclaiming the importance of groundwater regulation. 26 The on-the
ground reality in many places, however, still resembles the pre-regulatory
regime, with uneven coverage, sparse monitoring, and little enforcement. 27
Efforts to resolve the tensions between property rights and environmental
protection, and among competing property users, therefore remain in their
nascent stages, and groundwater management offers a window into the

COLLECTIVE ACTION 107 (1990) ("Water underlying any parcel of land ...can be siphoned to a
neighbor's land. ...
").
21. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250 (discussing ecological consequences of groundwater
pumping); Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State
Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL.
L. 845 (1998).
22. See, e.g., Votteler, supra note 21 (describing how Texas' Edwards Aquifer became a key
battleground in this conflict).
23. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL.L. REv. 561, 561 (1984) (describing this question as "[b]y far the most intractable constitutional
property issue").
24. See BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 444-45 (5th ed. 2012); Antonio Rossmann & Michael J. Steel, Forging the New Water
Law: Public Regulation of "Proprietary" Groundwater Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903, 906-07 (1982).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 93-103.
26. For example, while Texas holds a reputation as one of the laggards of groundwater law, its
courts have endorsed groundwater regulation, and the state legislature has empowered groundwater
management districts to exercise regulatory authority. See, e.g., Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground
Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633 (Tex. 1996) (endorsing a legislative role in water use
regulation).
27. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive
Management, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) (noting the prevalence of "lax legal rules and poor
enforcement"); infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
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application of the Fifth Amendment to a still-underdeveloped fringe of
property law.28
This Article addresses how our legal systems are, and should be,
responding to that challenge. In so doing, it offers three contributions to
the

existing legal literature.

First, this

Article provides

the first

comprehensive analysis of past groundwater/takings cases, as well as the
first guide for courts considering such cases in the future. Second, that
analysis advances a broader debate over the application of takings doctrine
to water rights generally. That broader debate has received substantial
attention, but commentators have focused almost exclusively on the law of
surface water. 29 An inquiry into groundwater disputes can therefore shed
new light on an old, but still heated, debate. Third, all of this discussion
supports an argument directly relevant to litigation now working its way
through the courts. That argument, in brief, is that neither judicial
precedent nor legal theory provides any basis for granting groundwater use
rights, or water rights more generally, special favoritism under the takings
clause.30

This Article begins by explaining what groundwater is, how
groundwater law has evolved, and why groundwater management
continues to generate lawsuits. In Part II, I explore how the judicial system
has responded to those challenges. The analysis begins in Texas, where a
recent decision brought national attention to the intersection of

28. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 6, at 252-53 (discussing the tendency toward belated and
partial responses to groundwater overuse); Joseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morsel of
California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 269, 270 (2003) ("[California] groundwater is
effectively unregulated.").
29. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, A Conversation about Takings and Water Rights, 83 Tx. L. REV.
1985 (2005); Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
1 (2002); Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551 (2002); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the
Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990); Josh Patashnik, Note, Physical Takings,
Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365 (2011).
The last few years have produced a few law review articles specifically focused on the Texas
controversies. See Gerald Torres, Liquid Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 143
(2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/4/torres.html; Deborah Clarke Trejo, Identifying and
Valuing Groundwater Withdrawal Rights in the Context of Takings Claims A Texas Case Study, 23
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 409 (2010); Gregory S. Friend, Note, The Quick of the Matter: The Proposition of
Takings Litigation under the Save Our Springs Ordinance, 25 VT. L. REv. 545 (2001); Ashlie
Newman, Note, Edwards Aquifer v. Day and the Future of Groundwater Regulation in Texas, 31 REv.
LITIG. 403 (2012).
30. One contribution this Article does not endeavor to offer is a detailed exploration of the ways
different groundwater law doctrines should influence takings analyses. While those questions are
interesting, the core argument here implies that they should not be crucially important. Under multiple
systems of groundwater law, and in periods of flux between systems, courts have allowed regulatory
constraints while rarely finding takings, and I argue that those traditions are appropriate.

2013]

TAKING GROUNDWATER

groundwater law and takings doctrine." But takings cases involving
groundwater are not new, and Part II therefore addresses the full set of
published groundwater/takings decisions produced by American courts. It
shows that American courts have traditionally treated groundwater rights
as property rights subject to constitutional protection, but also have almost
always allowed government to regulate groundwater use without paying
compensation.32 These conclusions undermine two dueling theories
arguing that water rights should either be categorically excluded from, or
categorically favored within, takings analyses.33 What approach is
normatively desirable is another question, but the groundwater cases
provide powerful evidence that neither categorical approach has been a
significant part of our water law tradition. Courts instead3 have
favored a
4
combination of property rights and deference to regulation.
Part III turns to those normative questions. Although case law at the
intersection of groundwater regulation and takings doctrine may seem
somewhat settled, the partial consensus is fragile. In part, that fragility
arises from a thin theoretical basis; the courts' conclusions rarely provide a
deeper analysis of the relationship between groundwater regulation,
takings doctrine, and property theory. If they do provide that deeper
discussion, the reasoning is sometimes at odds with strands of the
Supreme Court's more recent takings jurisprudence.35 That leaves the
decisions vulnerable to theoretical attacks, which libertarian-leaning
judges, legislators, and property theorists are quite ready to supply, and
which have gained at least moments of traction in other analogous
contexts. 36 Part III therefore considers the implications of foundational

31. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012). For a more recent, and
potentially even more controversial, decision, see Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013).
32. The recent Bragg decision is a significant exception to that tradition.
33. For arguments that water right restrictions should be subject to a categorical physical takings
analysis, see Patashnik, supra note 29, at 404-15; Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of
Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western
Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1111-14 (2009). For diametrically opposed
arguments, except for the shared premise that water rights merit exceptional treatment, see, e.g.,
Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 687 (2008)
("[A]ppropriators do not have full takings property."); Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of
Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 49, 50 (2010) ("[W]ater is too unlike land to
be subject to private property holdings.").
34. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 29, at 260 ("The constitutional law of water is the same as the
constitutional law of potatoes and pork chops.").
35. See infra text accompanying notes 219-25.
36.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985); Shepard, supra note 33; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49
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property theories for the intersection of groundwater regulation and
takings doctrine. My conclusion, in a nutshell, is that the courts have been
getting things largely right, even if their explanations have often been
sparse. Treating groundwater rights as property is consistent with, though
perhaps not mandated by, our traditional approaches to property rights.
And no property theory justifies subjecting groundwater regulations to
heightened judicial scrutiny.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF GROUNDWATER LAW

Central Texas contains what might be the nation's highest-profile
aquifer.3 7 The Edwards Aquifer irrigates thousands of acres of crops and
serves as the primary water supply for approximately 2.1 million people.38
The aquifer also supports a unique set of ecosystems, some of which
contain threatened and endangered species.3 9 Use of Edwards Aquifer
water is subject to a complex statutory and regulatory regime, which the
Texas Legislature initiated in response to litigation brought under the
Federal Endangered Species Act. 4 0 That litigation in return responded to
unsustainable levels of groundwater use, which were depleting the aquifer
and threatening the surface and subsurface ecosystems dependent upon
it. 41 The Edwards Aquifer Authority, a regional administrative agency,
now implements that regulatory scheme.42 But it must do so against the
backdrop of a common law groundwater regime that purports to allow
unlimited pumping so long as water remains physically available, and
amid a political culture characterized by skepticism of regulation.4 3 One

Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001) (holding that regulatory water use restrictions are compensable as physical
takings).
37. The other candidate forthis oxymoronic distinction would be the Ogallala Aquifer, which
underlies significant parts of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska. See C.W. FETTER, APPLIED
HYDROGEOLOGY 263 (4th ed. 2001).
38. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., HYDROLOGIC DATA REPORT FOR 2010 3 (2011), available at

http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/documents/2011 Hamilton-etal 2010HydrologicData.pdf; see also Todd
H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of the End to Fifty Years of Conflict over
the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 257, 258-72 (2002) (describing the aquifer).
39. Votteler, supra note 38, at 271; see also Votteler, supra note 21, at 851.
40. See Votteler, supra note 21, at 856-60 (describing the genesis of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority Act).

41. Id.; see also Zekster et al., supra note 14, at 398.
42. See Edwards Aquifer Authority, available at http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/index.php (last
visited Dec. 19, 2013).
43. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999) (declining to
depart from the "rule of capture," a common law doctrine that allows landowners to pump without
limit from beneath their lands); David M. Konisky, Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to
the Bottom Argument, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 321, 327 (2007) (noting that environmental
managers perceive Texas to be one of the states with the weakest environmental enforcement efforts).
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frequent result, particularly in the last several years, has been takings
litigation.44
The Edwards Aquifer battles exemplify a broader struggle over
groundwater regulation. This section describes how and why those
conflicts come about. I begin with a groundwater primer, explaining where
groundwater comes from, why it is economically and ecologically
valuable, and how it can be so difficult to manage.45 I then turn to the legal
systems governing groundwater management and explain why they often
generate uncertainty and conflicting expectations-or, in other words, why
they create fertile ground for takings cases. Finally, I turn to the recent
evolution of takings doctrine and water rights, and explain why
persistent-albeit overstated-ambiguities about the application of takings
doctrine to water rights regulation heighten the potential for legal claims.
The basic point is that the Edwards Aquifer battles both continue an
established conflict and foreshadow the future.
A The Contested Resource
At some point in our education, almost all of us have learned about the
water cycle. 46 We are taught how water evaporates from the ocean,
precipitates over the land, and flows through streams and rivers back to the
ocean, supporting human and ecological systems along the way. What
many people do not realize is that much of that cycle happens
underground. Particularly in undeveloped landscapes, most precipitation
evaporates, is transpired by plants, or infiltrates through the ground
surface; only a small percentage travels to surface waterways as overland
48
flow.
Water that infiltrates the surface then percolates downward until 49it
hits the water table, which is the level below which all of the pore space

44. See, e.g., Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-1129-XR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23380 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008); Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Edwards
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729
(Tex. 2002); Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.
1996); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug.
28, 2013).
45. For a more detailed groundwater primer, see THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 448463.
46. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE WATER CYCLE FOR KIDS, available at
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle-kids.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
47. See id.
48.

See

COMM.

ON

REDUCING

STORMWATER

DISCHARGE

CONTRIBUTIONS

TO

WATER

POLLUTION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MGMT. IN THE UNITED STATES

(2009).
49.

156

"Pore space" is the space between particles of silt, sand, gravel, or rock. See THOMPSON ET

AL., supra note 24, at 449.
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in the soil or rock is saturated with water. 50 Below the water table,
groundwater tends to flow laterally, and much of that water will eventually
discharge into surface waterways. 51 The rates of flow may be very slowhydrogeologists would consider a meter per day to be a relatively fast flow
rate-and water passing through clay or non-porous rock may barely
move at all. 52 A saturated and relatively permeable subsurface layer
through which water moves more quickly, and from53 which it can readily

be pumped, is commonly referred to as an "aquifer.,
Aquifers contain a surprising percentage of freshwater resources.
Globally, most freshwater is frozen in glaciers and icecaps. 54 Of the
remaining freshwater, ninety-eight percent is beneath the ground.55 Some
of that groundwater is far below the surface, and therefore is difficult for
humans to access and plays little role in sustaining surface water
ecosystems. 56 But even at near-surface levels, the aggregate quantity of
groundwater in many areas greatly exceeds the quantity in surface lakes,

rivers, and streams.5
Beyond sheer abundance, several other characteristics make
groundwater resources highly valuable to people. In many regionsparticularly arid or semi-arid ones-groundwater is more geographically
dispersed than surface water. Consequently, while a farmer might need
extensive pipes or irrigation ditches-as well as complex legal
arrangements-to convey water from the nearest stream to her land, she
can extract groundwater, with relatively minimal capital investments, from
directly beneath her fields. 59 Groundwater's slow flow and evaporation
rates also make it more steadily available. 60 Surface streams typically run

50. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 4-5, 37-42.
51. See id. at 5. Some of that water will evaporate and become moisture in the unsaturated
vadose zone, and, depending upon the depth of groundwater, some will be absorbed by plants' roots.
Id.
52. See id. at 85 (providing hydraulic conductivity ranges for a variety of subsurface materials);
see also id. at 95 (describing "confining layers," which are geologic formations that retard water flow).
53. Id. at 95 ("An aquifer is a geologic unit that can store and transmit water at rates fast enough
to supply reasonable amounts to wells.") (emphasis removed).
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 445 ("In some areas, physically available
groundwater is so far below the surface that it is not cost-effective to pay for the pump 'lift' to the
surface.").
57. A classic example is the Ogallala Aquifer, which lies beneath much of the High Plains, an
area where surface streams are relatively rare. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 263.
58. See TODD & MAYS, supra note 8,at 15 ("The storage capacity of groundwater reservoirs
combined with small flow rates provide large, extensively distributed sources of water supply.").
59. See Mark Giordano, Global Groundwater? Issues and Solutions, 34 ANN. REv. ENVTL. RES.
153, 155 (2009).
60. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 446 ("There are no evaporative losses from ground-water
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low during summer and early fall, which are precisely the times when
municipal and agricultural water demands tend to peak. Groundwater
levels, however, remain relatively steady, unless an aquifer is being
pumped faster that its rate of recharge. 61 Finally, groundwater is often
cleaner than surface water. Surface waterways generally receive a
significant portion of their inflows from stormwater runoff, which, as the
Supreme Court recently noted, "is often heavily polluted., 62 Particularly
during warm seasons, surface waterways also can become highly fecund
63
breeding grounds for algae, bacteria, and other biological toxins.
Groundwater is vulnerable to human contamination, and it is by no means
biologically inert. 64 But the level of pollution in groundwater, even in
relatively urbanized
areas, is often much lower than in adjacent surface
65
water bodies.
As a consequence, groundwater use is extensive. In 2005, according to
the United States Geological Survey, the United States used approximately
82.6 billion gallons of groundwater per day. 66 Most of that groundwater
supports irrigated agriculture, but municipal and industrial suppliers,
mining operations, and even aquaculture businesses are also widely
dependent upon groundwater, as is a multi-million dollar bottled water
industry. 67 In some states-Florida is the most populous examplegroundwater withdrawals exceed surface water withdrawals. 68 Aggregate
groundwater use in the United States may actually be declining, and per
capita groundwater use clearly is; the 2005 totals were five percent lower
than those from 2000, when the United States' groundwater use hit an alltime peak. 69 But the overall numbers remain immense.
While the physical nature of groundwater presents certain advantages
for human users, it also creates challenges. Perhaps the largest challenge is

storage .... ").

61. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 155.
62. L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 712 (2013); see
Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 431,

441-42 (2011) (discussing sources of stormwater pollution).
63. See EPA, Cyanobacterial Harmfful Algal Blooms (CyanoHABs), available at www2.epa.gov/
nutrient-policy-data/cyanobacterial-harmful-algal-blooms-cyanohabs (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
64. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 289 (noting recent literature describing ecosystems within

aquifers).
65. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 155.
66. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6.
67. See NAT'L GROUNDWATER Ass'N, supra note 2 (stating that the bottled water industry used

5.34 billion gallons of groundwater in 2001).
68. See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3 (providing groundwater use
statistics).
69. Id. at 43-44.
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that aquifers typically span property boundaries, and groundwater moves
in response to pumping. Consequently, wells on one property, if pumped
vigorously enough, can suck in water from adjacent lands, lowering the
water table beneath those lands in the process. 1 If the drawdown is
sufficiently large, wells will eventually run dry. The same problem can
occur on a regional or even international scale, with one set of
groundwater users' aggressive pumping interfering with others' ability to
access the resource. 72 Managing any shared resource is generally easier if
each user's consumption is easily monitored, but groundwater use can be
difficult to track. 7 Unless one watches the sprinklers very closely, or
unless users are subject to mandatory reporting requirements, it is hard to
tell how much water your neighbor is using. Subsurface groundwater
flow also can be hard to measure, and determining the extent of
interference among competing users can be difficult. Groundwater
therefore represents a classic example of a common-pool resource, with
limited monitoring capacity exacerbating all the widely identified
challenges associated with managing such commons. 76
To complicate matters further, groundwater also plays a critical
ecological role. Some of the groundwater that infiltrates into the
subsurface never re-enters the surficial portion of the water cycle. But
many shallow aquifers discharge water into wetlands, streams, and lakes,
as well as providing sustenance to riparian vegetation alongside surface
waterways. That groundwater recharge tends to be steadier, cleaner, and
less prone to temperature extremes than surface water inflows. 8 It
therefore helps maintain streamflows and lake levels between rain events;

70. See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 107. For a detailed discussion of the effects of groundwater
pumping, see TODD & MAYS, supra note 8, at 152-98.
71.

See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 454.

72. See, e.g., FETTER, supra note 37, at 267 (showing declining water levels in the Ogallala
Aquifer); MARQ DE VILLIERS, WATER: THE FATE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE 200-03 (2000)
(describing the role of aquifer depletion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).
73. See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 94-100 (explaining the importance of monitoring for
management of common-pool resources).
74. See Carol M. Rose, From H20 to C0 2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50
ARIz. L. REV. 91, 99 (2008) ("Groundwater is invisible and elusive, and because it is relatively easy to
tap from a great variety of locations, its use is hard to monitor."). See also M. RHEAD ENION, UNDER
WATER: MONITORING AND REGULATING GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA 9-12 (2011) (noting that

California lacks any statewide system for monitoring groundwater use).
75. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 458-63 (describing informational challenges).
76. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250 ("[G]roundwater is also a natural commons."); id. at 245
(explaining how "opacity of user behavior" makes common pool resources more difficult to manage).
77. See generally WINTER ET AL., supra note 7 (explaining interconnections between surface
water and groundwater).
78. See Owen, supra note 62, at 441-42 (discussing stormwater pollution); FETTER, supra note
37, at 446 (describing how water quality can improve as water passes through the subsurface).

2013]

TAKING GROUNDWATER

keeps temperatures within a range in which fish and other aquatic species
can survive; dilutes pollution carried into surface waters by stormwater
flows; and sustains riparian habitats. 9 Without groundwater, many of our
waterways would be ecologically impoverished, and some would cease to
be waterways at all.80
The ecological importance of groundwater opens up another front for
potential conflict. Across the nation, examples abound of surface
waterways drawn down, or even entirely dried out, by groundwater
pumping.81 The Edwards Aquifer provides a particularly salient example
of the problem. There, pumping has lowered water levels in several major
springs, placing human recreation and endangered species at risk. 82 Similar
conflicts have arisen even in relatively well-watered places like
northwestern California, where groundwater pumping along the Scott
River-an important salmon stream-has generated ongoing litigation,8 3
and eastern Massachusetts, where groundwater pumping helped dry out
the Ipswich River and led to a series of legal battles.8 4 These examples
represent just the tip of an iceberg, and the iceberg may be growing.
Because groundwater moves relatively slowly, there can be a significant
time lag between the onset of pumping and the first evidence of ecological
impact. 5 But those delayed impacts will eventually arrive, and with so
many aquifers being overdrafted, present pumping practices are sowing
the seeds for additional future conflicts.
As with conflicts among competing consumptive users, these
ecological conflicts are not easy to resolve. To some extent, the problems
are similar: monitoring challenges complicate efforts to determine when
overall pumping levels are problematic and whose individual pumping is
causing the problem.86 Ecological problems also often result from the
cumulative impact of many different wells, rather than from just a few

79. See Masaki Hayashi & Donald 0. Rosenberry, Effects of Ground Water Exchange on the
Hydrology and Ecology of Surface Water, 40 GROUND WATER 309 (2002).
80. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 35-50 (describing the former Santa Cruz River).
81. See generally id. (providing multiple case studies of groundwater overuse).
82. See id. at 92.
83. See John Bowman, Karuk Study Results Released, SISKIYOUDAILY.COM (July 1, 2012, 10:33
AM), http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/article/20120604/NEWS/306049993/0/SEARCH
(updating
description of Karuk Tribe Report on the Scott River controversy).
84. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 99-111.
85. Marios Sophocleous, Groundwater Recharge and Sustainability in the High Plains Aquifer in
Kansas, USA 13 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 351, 354 (2005) ("[T]he current apparent health of an exploited
aquifer and the ecosystems that depend upon it does not necessarily indicate that the situation will be
sustainable in the longer term .... ).

86. See generally THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 458-63 (discussing informational
challenges).
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discrete sources. In whatever context it arises, that sort of cumulative
87
environmental problem is often quite difficult for regulators to resolve.
Finally, the combination of groundwater's relative invisibility and the time
lags between pumping and its ecological consequences all increase the
temptation to pump now and worry about the consequences later.88 Quite
often, that is exactly what we have done.8 9
B. Evolving and Uncertain Groundwater Law
The presence of a common-pool resource subject to diverse and
competing demands clearly creates a legal challenge, but it need not
generate takings claims. Some common-pool resources are managed
without much legal conflict, or with the legal battles fought on other
fronts. 90 Takings claims tend to arise where resource users can claim
property interests in the contested resource and where the law governing
the resource is transitioning toward more extensive regulatory control. 91
With groundwater, all of those conditions are present. In the legal systems
of the United States, groundwater rights are widely understood as property
rights. 92 And states' systems of common-law rights, while often
ill-defined, frequently purport to allow extensive or even, in a few
instances, nearly unlimited pumping, which places them in uncertain
tension with emerging regulatory controls. 93

These uncertainties and tensions have their historic roots in a mix of
scientific misunderstanding, informational limitations, and laissez-faire
common law. 94 For centuries, groundwater science, to the extent it existed,

87. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 64-65 (2010) (summarizing
the challenges of responding to such problems).

88. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 255-65 (explaining why common-pool resources are often
poorly managed in contexts of uncertainty).
89. See generally GLENNON, supra note 15 (providing examples of groundwater overuse).
90. See generally OSTROM, supra note 20 (providing case studies of successfully managed
common-pool resources).
91. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003).
Perhaps the best example of such a transition involves wetlands, which once were widely viewed as
nuisances that landowners could destroy at will and now are widely viewed as ecologically important
and worthy of regulatory protection-and which often generate takings cases. See, e.g., Just v.
Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (discussing this shift).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
94.

See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860

105

(1977) (attributing the pro-development orientation of groundwater law to its emergence at a time
when "laissez-faire assumptions firmly took hold of the imaginations of American judges").
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was founded upon colorful misconceptions. 95 Those misconceptions
largely precluded states from developing private-or public-law systems
for limiting overall consumption or for dividing aquifers into shares for
competing users, and well into the nineteenth century, groundwater law
represented a near-anarchic exception to the otherwise well-developed
property regimes of the day. The traditional approach was perhaps best
expressed in Frazier v. Brown, an 1861 Ohio Supreme Court decision that
rejected any legal constraint on groundwater pumping. 96 The Frazier court
offered two justifications for its rule. First:
[b]ecause the existence, origin, movement and course of such
waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements,
are so secret, occult and concealed ... an attempt to administer any
set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.9
Second, the court asserted that a rule protecting downstream
landowners would inappropriately interfere with industrial progress.9 8
Frazier's "dark arts" holding, as one subsequent decision characterized
it, 99 illustrates two principles that for years dominated groundwater law.
The first is a principle of non-constraint. Frazier's "absolute dominion"
rule essentially allowed unrestrained pumping, encouraging aggressive
groundwater use not only without public regulatory constraint, but also
with hardly any possibility of a check under private common law. 100 The
second principle is a legal divide between groundwater and surface waters.

95. See TODD & MAYS, supra note 8, at 3-4 (describing groundwater theories, many wildly
inaccurate, from Homer, Aristotle, Descartes, and other luminaries). In general, early thinkers believed
groundwater moved in highly unpredictable and mysterious ways, and that attempting to regulate it
therefore would be futile. Id.
96. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 15
Ohio St. 3d 384, 387 (1984). Frazier was not the first Anglo-American decision to so hold. See, e.g.,
Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & Wels. 324, 349-54 (Ex. 1843). It was, however, perhaps the most
colorful in its chosen language.
97. Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311.
98. Id. ("[Any such recognition of correlative rights, would interfere, to the material detriment
of the common wealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining, the construction of highways and
railroads, with sanitary regulations, building and the general progress of improvement in works of
embellishment and utility.").
99. McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ohio 2005).
100. See Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 300, 311-12 (rejecting the possibility of even a private law claim
against a competing groundwater user). For these reasons, some lawyers have argued that traditional
groundwater law created no property rights at all, at least until the water was actually brought to the
surface, for users lacked any control of the resource and could not exclude other competing users. This
argument seems sensible, but courts in absolute dominion states have not yet been persuaded. See infra
text accompanying notes 178-82.
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By the nineteenth century, no court would have alleged that rivers moved
in secret, occult ways, and the legal systems for allocating surface water
were relatively sophisticated.1°1 But even as scientists became increasingly
cognizant of the close relationship between ground and surface water
systems, 10 2 the legal system continued to insist that groundwater and
surface water were separate, with the complex laws applicable to the latter
unnecessary to the former. 10 3
On paper, the primacy of these principles now is substantially
diminished. The changes have occurred in several ways. First, absolute
dominion remains the law of only a few states, and even those states now
also have statutory and administrative laws that purport to regulate
groundwater use. 10 4 Many states have moved toward common law systems
that entitle each groundwater user only to a reasonable share of
groundwater use, or toward prior appropriation systems, with groundwater
rights allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. 10 5 Second, some states
also now have, on paper at least, some integration between their systems
10 7
10 6
of groundwater and surface water rights. In prior appropriation states,
for example, later-developed groundwater rights are generally subordinate
to previously established surface rights, and surface users can sometimes
enjoin groundwater pumping.10 8 Third, in many states, management
authority over groundwater is moving toward administrative agencies and

101. By the early nineteenth century, American surface water law was sufficiently extensive to
merit its own treatise. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES (7th ed.
1877) (1825).
102. See T.N. Narasimhan, Hydrogeology in North America: Past and Future, 13
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 7, 8 (2005) (describing the discovery of groundwater/surface water interactions).
103. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 30. The sole exception to this general rule applied to
groundwater flowing in known and definite channels. See, e.g., N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 823 (2006) (quoting Cal. Water Code § 1200 (West 2009)).
States generally treat such water as part of the surface water system. See, e.g., id. at 824. But
discerning what groundwater meets that definition is not easy. Indeed, although I studied
hydrogeology as an undergraduate and then worked as an environmental geologist, I never even heard
the phrase "known and definite channels" before coming to law school.
104. Compare, e.g., Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) ("We decline to abandon
the absolute dominion rule.") with An Act Concerning the Sustainable Use of and Planning for Water
Resources, ch. 399, 2007 Me. Laws 975 (creating a permit process for new "significant groundwater
wells" in Maine). Similarly, Texas's continued adherence to the rule of capture is balanced by
legislation allowing the creation of groundwater management districts. See TUX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.116(a)(2) (West 2011) (authorizing groundwater management districts to regulate pumping).
105. See Maddocks, 728 A.2d at 153 ("Most jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use, or
American, rule or some variation of it.") (footnote omitted).
106. See, e.g., Kobobel v. Dep't of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 2011) (en banc)
(describing Colorado's integration of groundwater and surface water law).
107. Prior appropriation doctrine, which is the dominant legal system for water rights in the West,
allocates water rights on a first-come, first-served basis. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 167376.
108. See, e.g., Kobobel, 249 P.3d at 1136-38.
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away from the courts.10 9 Fourth and finally, the 1970s brought the
emergence of a broad superstructure of federal and state environmental
laws. 1 While none of those laws directly targeted groundwater use, some
could compel restraint where groundwater pumping was causing
environmental degradation. 1
Nevertheless, vestiges of the former era still permeate groundwater
law. A few states still do adhere to the absolute dominion rule.11 2 While
legislatures in those states also have created administrative regulatory
systems, their courts have not yet decided how to reconcile those
administrative constraints with a common law regime that takes
libertarianism to an extreme." And while most states have empowered
administrative agencies to manage groundwater, their management
schemes are riddled with exemptions, and many groundwater users remain
almost completely unregulated.1 1 4 Some states also have not given their
administrative agencies enough funding and support to prescribe limits on

109. Both Texas and Maine have statutes that exemplify this trend. See supra text accompanying
note 104. The Texas and Maine statutes both lodge authority in administrative agencies. See also
GARY C. BRYNER & ELIZABETH PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK OF THE WESTERN

UNITED STATES (2003) (describing groundwater management in western states; almost all rely on
statewide or local administrative agencies, and some use both).
110. See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004)
(describing environmental law's emergence and evolution). For an extended saga involving the
application of state environmental law to groundwater use, see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 24, at
91-25 (describing groundwater litigation in California's Owens Valley).
111. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 15, at 92-93 (describing the role of Endangered Species Act
litigation in Edwards Aquifer management).
112. See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) ("We decline to abandon the absolute
dominion rule."); Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999); see also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1055 & n.5 (Ind. 2001). See generally A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4:6 (2012) ("The absolute ownership rule is
still followed in some eastern states and in Texas. Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island
still purport to follow the absolute ownership rule .... ) (footnotes omitted).
113. This basic question was raised, though not resolved, in Texas's Day litigation. In Maine, it
has not yet come up. Other states have purported to address the issue, though not with a detailed legal
analysis. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., 759 N.E.2d at 1055 & n.5 (affirming the absolute dominion rule
while also noting "that the legislature has placed further restraints on the use of groundwater .... [W]e
do not view [these constraints] as having altered the common law property status of ground water.").
114. California is the most notorious example of a weak administrative system, but regulatory
systems in several other states, including New York and West Virginia, are similarly minimal. See
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE WATER WITHDRAWAL REGULATIONS, available
at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/state-water-withdrawal-regulations.aspx
(last visited
Dec. 26, 2013) ("California does not have a comprehensive permit process for regulation of
groundwater use."). The NCIS summary page also lists several states, including Alabama, Arkansas,
Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee, that require reporting but not permitting of groundwater
use. Id. Almost all states exempt some users-usually small or medium users; sometimes also
agricultural users-from registration and permitting requirements, or only apply their requirements to
portions of the state. See id.
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use, monitor compliance with these limits, and bring enforcement actions
against violators. 15 In theory, private litigation under common law
theories might fill that gap, at least outside of absolute dominion states.
But in reality, potential plaintiffs face daunting evidentiary challenges that
can effectively preclude litigation. To prevail, they must demonstrate not
only that they have been injured, but also by whom, and then must show
that the competing users' groundwater withdrawals exceeded their
reasonable shares.11 6 Between the complexities of aquifer hydrogeology,
the typical absence of information on groundwater withdrawals, and the
inherent vagueness of common law standards, those showings can be

difficult to make, and plaintiffs may not even try.11 7 Finally, while some
states have attempted to fully integrate groundwater and surface water
regimes, others are still attempting to manage two resources as though
interconnections do not exist. 8
This fitful and uneven process of legal evolution creates conditions
conducive to two types of takings claims. First, when legislatures or courts
do attempt to reform groundwater laws-for example, by shifting from an
absolute dominion standard to a permit-based system of administrative
regulation-the changes necessarily involve altering an established system
of property rights. Such shifts can easily generate takings claims, for many
property owners believe their rights are immune to such political shifts. 9
Second, even when regulators apply existing law to particular groundwater
users-perhaps by denying a permit to drill a well, or to pump it at the
applicant's desired level-they still may interfere with landowners'

115. See

CHARLES J. TAYLOR & WILLIAM M. ALLEY, GROUND-WATER-LEVEL MONITORING AND

2 (2001) ("[W]ater-level monitoring in the
United States is fragmented and largely subject to the vagaries of existing local projects."); Thompson,
THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM WATER-LEVEL DATA

supra note 27 (describing the prevalence of lax enforcement).

116. See Michael P. Mallery, Groundwater: A Call for a Comprehensive Management Program,
14 PAC. L.J. 1279, 1290 (1983) (noting chronic uncertainty over the scope of groundwater use rights in
non-adjudicated basins).
117. As an attorney representing groundwater users in California's Central Valley, I faced these
challenges. Some may become surmountable in a general adjudication for an entire groundwater basin,
but general adjudications are costly and time-consuming, and sometimes are not legally possible. See,
e.g., Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (declining to allow
a general groundwater adjudication in the absence of a statutory authorization); THOMPSON ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 490 n.37 (compiling sources that cite cost and time as deterrents to general
adjudications).
118. See BRYNER & PURCELL, supra note 109, at 7, 14 (noting the absence of integration in
California and Arizona).
119. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) ("[A] State, by
ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation .... ); see
also Doremus, supra note 91, at 3.
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expectations. 120 Those expectations may be difficult to reconcile with the
paper existence of common-law and regulatory limitations on groundwater
use, but they may be quite consistent with historic practices. 12' That

consistency then can easily create a sense, at least on the part of the
landowner, that an established property right is being taken.
C. The Takings Doctrine Overlay
A final complicating ingredient in this recipe for takings claims is a set
of uncertainties within takings doctrine itself. Takings doctrine remains
contested territory, and in recent years, water rights litigation has become
a major new front in that contest.122 The doctrine is not entirely unsettled;
indeed, some commentators have argued that existing takings case law is
actually becoming more ordered and consistent.
Nevertheless, a
competition among widely disparate conceptions of takings doctrine still
continues, and that competition creates additional uncertainty about the

relationship between takings doctrine and groundwater use regulation.
Despite the common characterizations of takings law as muddled,1

24

the

United States Supreme Court has seemed, at least at times, to be moving
toward a relatively stable conception of takings doctrine. Under the
standard approach, categorical takings tests, under which plaintiffs have a
relatively high likelihood of prevailing, apply to physical invasions and
direct appropriations of property and to complete wipeouts of value, even

120. See, e.g., Cross-Appellants' Brief at 5-15, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV) (describing the conflict between the Bragg's
expectation that they would have sufficient water to irrigate their pecan orchards and the regulatory
restrictions imposed by the Edwards Aquifer Authority).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18 (noting the prevalence of gaps and
non-enforcement in groundwater management regimes).
122. See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (evaluating a
takings claim based on denial of grazing permit and alleged loss of access to water); Casitas Mun.
Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (evaluating takings claim based on
species protection measures); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 328 (2005) (same);
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (same); see also Robin
Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as "Property" through Takings Litigation: Is there a Property
Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENvTL. L. 115, 125-44 (2012) (describing takings cases
involving water rights).
123. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 525, 527 (2009) (stating that Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), brought some
measure of peace, though not complete coherence, to takings doctrine); Robert Meltz, Takings Law
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 370 (2007) ("Close analysis reveals that
contemporary courts issue more or less predictable rulings in several areas of takings law.").
124. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 23; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-97 (1993);
Doremus, supra note 91, at 1.
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if those wipeouts were caused solely by regulatory constraints. 125 All
regulatory constraints that do not cause complete wipeouts are reviewed
under the ad hoc analytical standard set forth in Penn Central
Transportation Company v. New York City.1 26 The Penn Central analysis
is traditionally much friendlier to government defendants. 127 Wide
agreement also exists on the deeper purposes of takings doctrine. One
purpose, in the Supreme Court's oft-repeated words, is to "bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole., 128 But a competing purpose is to assure that government has some
power to regulate property use, for 'government regulation-by
definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,' ...
[and] '[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." 129 These tests and principles contain their ambiguities
and internal tensions, but, at least as constitutional tests go, they do
provide courts with enough guidance to render modern takings law a
moderately predictable field. 130

Nevertheless, the seemingly settled doctrine remains subject to a
fundamental challenge, one that would substantially restrict the
government's regulatory capacity. Over thirty years ago, Richard Epstein
argued for a radically different version of takings doctrine, under which
nearly any regulation that effectively transfers wealth would create
government liability.131 The United States Supreme Court has never
overtly adopted this approach in its entirety, but some of the Justices'
opinions, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggested
sympathy for this view. 132 Though less prevalent in recent decisions, such

125. See Meltz, supra note 123, at 329, 360-62.
126. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved a takings challenge to New York City's
landmark law, which the city had used to prevent Penn Central from building into the airspace above
Grand Central Station. The Court rejected the challenge, and it articulated a three-part standard for
evaluating regulatory takings claims: courts should consider "economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant"; the extent of interference "with distinct investment-backed
character of the governmental action." Id. at 124.

expectations";

and "the

127. See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing under the Ad
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

F. 121, 141 (2003) (providing statistics showing that landowners usually lose Penn Central claims).
128. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
129. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65 (1979) and Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
130. See Meltz, supra note 123, at 370 (describing "more or less predictable rulings").
131. EPSTEIN, supra note 36.
132. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and
Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 731-32 (2004) (describing the influence of this view on a series of
Supreme Court cases in the 1990s).
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signs of sympathy continue to appear, most prominently in the Court's
2010 decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection."' Writing for a conservative
plurality, Justice Scalia dismissed the possibility that states, either through

judicial or legislative action, might "[allow] for incremental modifications
to property law," and seemed to suggest that any such modification would
constitute a taking. 13 4 No Court majority has ever gone that far, but that

notion continues to influence litigants' positions. Perhaps even more
importantly, similar notions provide the foundations for legislative takings
initiatives and ballot measures across the country.135
One focal point of the property rights campaign has been the field of
water rights, where litigants and some commentators have opined that
courts should make much more extensive use of categorical takings
tests.1 36 Their campaign found its first major success twelve years ago. In
Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage District v. United States,13 the United
States Court of Federal Claims determined that environmental restrictions
on surface water use were compensable under a categorical physical
takings analysis. 138 The primary reasons, according to the court, were:
(1) because water rights are usufructuary, any use restriction effectively
eviscerates the right; and (2) to a plaintiff, it made little difference whether
the restraint followed from a regulatory constraint or from the government
physically removing the water; the impact was the same. 139 Both reasons,
if more widely adopted, would set water rights takings doctrine far apart

133. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
134. Id. at 2606 (responding to, and quoting, Justice Kennedy's concurrence); see J. Peter Byrne,
Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 619-20, 627 (2011) (describing and
critiquing this view).
135. See Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings
Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1520 (2007) ("This movement ... seeks to extend current Fifth
Amendment takings doctrine to give property owners a claim to compensation whenever government
regulation causes even slight decreases in the value of their property.").
136. See Shepard, supra note 33; Patashnik, supra note 29; Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial,
42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 129-32 (Ct. App. 2006) (considering, and rejecting, an argument that a
restriction on water use constituted a physical taking); Cross-Appellants' Brief at 45-50, Edwards
Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV)
(arguing that restrictions on groundwater use should be analyzed as physical takings).
137. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). Tulare Lake involved a challenge by agricultural interests in
California's Central Valley to water use restrictions designed to protect two fish species that had been
listed under the Federal Endangered Species Act. Id.
138. Id. at318-20; 324.
139. See id. at 319 ("In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use-the hallmark of a
regulatory action-completely eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use
of the water."); id. at 320 ("[W]hether the government decreased the water to which plaintiffs had
access by means of a dam or by means of pumping restrictions amounts to a distinction without a
difference.").
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from traditional takings doctrine. 140 Twelve years later, the Tulare Lake
decision stands almost entirely alone, save for one Federal Circuit decision
involving some peculiar facts. 14 1 Criticism has been widespread; the
Tulare Lake case itself lacks precedential value (and was later repudiated,
albeit anemically, by the judge who wrote it 142); and many more cases
have rejected its analytical methodology than have followed it. 143 But the
idea that water rights should be subject to a more plaintiff-friendly mode
of takings analysis still continues to find moments of traction.144 Adding to
the potential uncertainty is conspicuous judicial silence. It has been fifty
years since any takings case involving
water allocation emerged from the
145
United States Supreme Court.
The push for heightened protection of consumptive water use rights
also has inspired (and may partly be inspired by) countermovements. In
articles and amicus briefs, advocates favoring greater government
oversight over water resources have pressed very different versions of the
law of water rights and takings. Under the most prevalent view,
government should have broad discretion to regulate water use, and
plaintiffs should hardly ever be able to prove a taking when a regulation
restricts water use. That approach, according to its proponents, follows

140. See Benson, supra note 29, at 584-86 (explaining how the Tulare Lake case's
effect-on-the-plaintiff reasoning diverges from traditional takings analysis). In its land use cases, the
Court has never suggested that use rights should enjoy higher status than ownership rights.
141. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (also holding
that a use restriction should be analyzed as a potential physical taking). Casitas involved a requirement
that the plaintiffs take water out of their diversion ditch and redirect it to the river, and this fact seems
to have been centrally important to the court's decision. See id. at 1290-93. The court did not endorse
a more general principle that all regulatory restrictions on water use should be analyzed as physical
takings. See id. The Federal Circuit later dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff did not hold a
property right to the water it claimed had been taken. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
142. See Casitas Mun. Water District v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007), rev'd, 543
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
143. See, e.g., CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(declining to use a physical takings analysis); Washoe Cnty. v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320, 1326-27
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (also declining to use a physical takings analysis); Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of
Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e disagree with Tulare Lake's conclusion
that the government's imposition of pumping restrictions is no different than an actual physical
diversion of water."). For sample academic critiques of the Tulare Lake decision, see Benson, supra
note 29; Gray, supra note 29.
144. See, e.g., Patashnik, supra note 29, at 404-15; Shepard, supra note 33. See also Craig, supra
note 122, at 122 ("[I]f the core property right at issue is the right to use ... any interference with that
right to use begins to look more akin to a physical taking.") (footnotes omitted).
145. The Court has been actively involved in takings cases involving water resources. See, e.g.,
Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (considering a takings claim
arising from temporary but repeated flooding); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (considering takings claims involving littoral rights). But the last
Supreme Court case to directly address a takings issue involving water allocation was Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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from basic principles of water law. 146 They argue that water rights are
inherently more limited and contingent than ownership interests in land or
personal property, and that private use rights must coexist with, and often
remain subordinate to, overriding public interests in waterways.147
Consequently, to an even greater extent than land use rights, water use
always remains subject to governmental oversight and control 1 48 A
smaller group of advocates would take this sort of argument several steps
further, and claim that water rights lack key attributes of more traditional
property rights and therefore are not constitutional property at all. 149
The clash among these competing views has profound implications for
takings cases involving groundwater regulation. If the Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality view becomes the law of the land, and state
courts and legislatures effectively lose the ability to revise and update state
property law, groundwater law will remain with one foot firmly cemented
in the nineteenth century. The gradual movement toward increasing
regulatory oversight could largely cease. 15 Similarly, the adoption of a
categorical takings test-or even a less-than-categorical test that still
involves heightened scrutiny of government actions-for groundwater
rights restrictions would severely restrict the application of legal
constraints, either existing or new, to groundwater use. 15 1 Either
development would represent a boon to the traditional approach of
unrestrained pumping, and a substantial burden to more modern legal
approaches predicated upon regulatory balancing and constraint.
Conversely, if courts decide that groundwater rights do not qualify as
property, takings protection for groundwater use rights would diminish.
Whether that would substantially change the level of restrictions on
private users is not an easy question to answer; while such an outcome

146. See generally Gray, supra note 29 (arguing that the nature of water rights makes takings
claims less viable than in a land-use context); Leshy, supra note 29 (same).
147. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 29, at 4. That view does find ample support in surface water case
law. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945) (quoting United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) ("[T]hat the running water in a
great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.")); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (holding that private surface water rights are inherently
limited by state public trust
authority).
148. See generally Gray, supra note 29; Leshy, supra note 29.
149. See, e.g., Zellmer & Harder, supra note 33.

150. See
AND

JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., PROPERTY VALUES

OREGON

MEASURE

37:

ExPOSING

THE FALSE

PREMISE

OF

REGULATION'S

HARM

TO

LANDOWNERS 5 (2007), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/102009propertyValues
AndOregonMeasure37.pdf (finding a pronounced tendency to waive or avoid regulations rather than
pay compensation).
151. See id.
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seems intuitively plausible, other countries that lack takings protection for
water users still are often quite solicitous of private water use. 152 But at the
very least, that shift would diminish the prevalence of takings claims. 151
Finally, if an intermediate position prevails, takings protection would
remain available in rare instances, but almost all instances of groundwater
use regulation would not lead to compensation requirements.
II. GROUNDWATER, TAKINGS, AND THE COURTS
In 1994, R. Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel bought 381.4 acres of
agricultural land in Texas. 154 The Edwards Aquifer lies beneath their
property, and Day and McDaniel hoped to tap the aquifer to irrigate oats,
peanuts, and pastures. 155 However, to continue to use water from their one
well, which was partially defunct, or to replace it with a new one, they
needed authorization from the Edwards Aquifer Authority. 156 They applied
for, and received, authorization for pumping, but they did not get nearly as
much water as they wanted. The Edwards Aquifer Authority's permitting
scheme favors users who were pumping prior to implementation of the
Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, and Day and McDaniel did not fit into
that category. 157 Consequently, their permit came with what they viewed
as severe restrictions on the amount of groundwater they could pump. 158
Day and McDaniel sued, alleging a taking. 159 The litigation has not yet
produced a final judgment. But in a February 2012 decision, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that Day and McDaniel have property rights in
the water beneath their land, even prior to pumping, and that a regulatory
1 60
scheme that limits the exercise of those rights could effect a taking.
Many property rights advocates and rural water users celebrated the

152. For example, New Zealand does not provide takings protection to water users, but the
absence of such protection has not prevented aggressive industrial and agricultural exploitation of New
Zealand's waterways. See WATER PROGRAMME OF ACTION INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GRP.,
N.Z. MINISTRY OF ENV'T, FRESHWATER FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 12-14

(2004) (describing New Zealand's system of "resource consents," which permit water use without
creating ownership rights, as well as the demands placed upon New Zealand's waterways).
153. They probably would not disappear, for plaintiffs still could argue that restrictions on
groundwater use effectively took their land. See, e.g., Pratt Constr. Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 76
Cal. Rptr. 3d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (raising such a claim).
154. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2012).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 818-19.
157. Id. at 818-21 ("With few exceptions, water may not be withdrawn from the aquifer through
wells drilled after June 1, 1993.") (footnote omitted).
158. Id. at 820-21.
159. Id. at 821.
160. Id. at 843 ("[A] landowner cannot be deprived of all beneficial use of the groundwater below
his property merely because he did not use it during an historical period and supply is limited.").
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decision as a landmark victory, while environmentalists and government
water 1 managers warned of a grave threat to sustainable groundwater
16

use.

Day is probably the nation's most prominent groundwater/takings case,
and it already has begun to receive academic attention. 62 But it is not the
only1 one.
Over the past century, state and federal courts have decided at
least 63 fifty cases involving alleged takings of groundwater. 164 This

161. See, e.g., Mose Buchele, What the State Supreme Court Ruling on Water Rights Means for
Texas, STATEIMPACT (Feb. 24, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/O2/24/whatdoes-the-supreme-court-ruling-on-water-rights-mean/; Bruce Wright, A Victory for Property Rights:
Texas Court Decision Affirms Right to Water, FISCAL NOTES (May 7, 2012), http://www.window
.state.tx.us/comptrol/fnotes/fn1204/water-rights.php; Gabriel Eckstein, Texas Water Flowing Above
Ground is Public but Below It's Private, STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.startelegram.com (archives access requires password) ("[T]he court has effectively undermined and
jeopardized the state's ability to respond to water shortages and plan for its future.").
162. See Torres, supra note 29. The case already has begun appearing in water law casebooks.
See, e.g., THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 498-505.
163. This number includes only decisions available on Lexis or Westlaw's databases. Because not
every case produces a decision, and because not every decision is published on Lexis and Westlaw, the
total number of cases is probably higher. Nevertheless, a search of popular media databases did not
reveal any additional cases.
164. See Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2009); Washoe Cnty. v. United
States, 319 F.3d 1320 (Fed Cir. 2003); Sierra Nevada SW Enters. v. King, No. 3:10-CV-579-RCJRAM, 2011 WL 3204737 (D. Nev. July 27, 2011); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV1129-XR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23380 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008); Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d
770 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Williamson v. Guadalupe Cnty. Groundwater Conservation Dist., 343 F. Supp.
2d 580, 598-99 (W.D. Tex. 2004); Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D.N.Y. 2002);
Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122-24 (D. Nev. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, Fallini v. Hodel,
963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992); Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270, 1277-78 (D. Ariz. 1982); Walker
v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 685, 706-07 (2008); Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53 (1994),
judgment vacated and remanded by Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Jensen v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 583 (1989); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River Sys. and Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1083 (Ariz. 2000); Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638
P.2d 1324, 1326-30 (Ariz. 1981); Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Dep't, 580 P.2d 704, 705-07
(Ariz. 1978); Sw. Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768-70 (Ariz. 1955); Aikins v. Ariz. Dep't of
Water Res., 743 P.2d 946, 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 2006); Acosta v. Big Bear Cmty. Servs. Dist., 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2253 (Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004); Kobobel v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127 (Colo. 2011)
(en banc); Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 347-48 (Colo. 1994); Vill.
of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9
P.3d 409, 492-95 (Haw. 2000); City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm'n, 30 Haw. 912,
916-17 (1929); Natural Res. Comm'n of Ind. v. AMAX Coal Co., 638 N.E.2d 418, 429 (Ind. 1994); F.
Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d
578 (Kan. 1962); Md. Aggregates Ass'n v. State, 655 A.2d 886, 899-900 (Md. 1995); City of Gaylord
v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006); Jones v.
East Lansing-Meridian Water & Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Crookston
Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (Minn. 1980); Bamford v. Upper
Republican Natural Res. Dist., 512 N.W.2d 642, 651-52 (Neb. 1994); In re Town of Nottingham, 904
A.2d 582 (N.H. 2006); Bounds v. State, 252 P.3d 708 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), aff'd on other grounds by
Bounds v. State ex rel. D'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457 (N.M. 2013); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728
(N.D. 1968); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d. 640 (Ohio 2005); Smith v. Summit Cnty.,
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section reviews those cases. 65 It begins by providing a general description
of the case law, focusing on when and where the cases have arisen and
what sort of claims they involve. It then turns to an analysis of reasoning
and outcomes. That discussion supports several important conclusions,
each of which sheds light on ongoing debates about the proper application
of takings doctrine to groundwater, and on larger discussions about the
implications of takings doctrine for water rights.
A The Increasing Frequency of Groundwater/Takings Cases
Groundwater/takings litigation is a growing phenomenon. Over the
past sixty years, every decade has brought at least as many published
groundwater/takings decisions as the decade before. The current decade is
on pace to continue that trend. The overall numbers remain modest-fifty
cases is by no means an avalanche of litigation-but with increasing stress
on water resources and continued emphasis on property rights litigation,
there is little reason to expect the growth to cease.

721 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); State ex. rel. Hensley v. City of Columbus, No. lOAP-840,
2011 WL 2586353 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2011); Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842
(Okla. 2006); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day,
369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Horton, No. 04-09-00375-CV, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 736 (Feb. 3, 1010); Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010); Weber
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Gailey, 328 P.2d 175 (Utah 1958); Peterson v. Dep't of Ecology,
596 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1979); Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 835 N.W.2d 160 (Wis.
2013); Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (unpublished).
165. The list of cases comes with a few additional caveats. First, I included cases where plaintiffs
sought to enjoin some government action because it allegedly would cause a taking as well as cases
where plaintiffs sought damages foralleged takings. Second, the boundaries of the set are not all crisp.
In some older cases, courts mixed takings and due process arguments, and the cases' status as
groundwater/takings decisions is ambiguous. See, e.g., F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d
1164, 1167, 1174 (Kan. 1981) (describing a complaint grounded exclusively in the equal protection
provision of the Kansas Constitution, but ruling for the government defendant because "[tihe statute
does not effect an unconstitutional taking of property"). More recent cases sometimes are ambiguous
about whether the case concerns an alleged taking of groundwater use rights or whether groundwater
regulation or protection was just a factor contributing to actions that allegedly took land use or surface
water rights. See, e.g., Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010) (rejecting a claim
alleging a taking of surface water and land use rights but premised on the diversion of groundwater
from beneath the plaintiffs' land); Charles A. Pratt Constr. Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 76 Cal. Rptr.
3d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (denying a takings claim based on land use restrictions partially motivated
by the unavailability of groundwater). For that reason, another researcher compiling a similar list
might include a few more or less decisions. The differences, however, would likely be small.
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TABLE 1: GROUNDWATER/TAKINGS CASES BY DECADE

IPre 1960 11906-9 11970-79
3

1

3

1

3

11980-89 11990-99 12000-09 12010-1
1

8

1

8

1

16

1

9

Those cases also arise from all over the country. 166 Not surprisingly,
most come from relatively arid states, where water litigation traditionally
has more of a prominent role. But cases arising out of relatively
well-watered Midwestern and eastern states show that the emergence of
groundwater/takings litigation represents a national trend.
TABLE 2: GROUNDWATER/TAKINGS CASES BY STATE OF ORIGIN
# Cases
1
State
Florida
Indiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Dakota

21
4
5
6
7
California
none Ohio Nevada Arizona Texas
Colorado
Hawaii
Kansas
Michigan
New Mexico
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

While the cases have arisen from a wide variety of fact patterns, two
particular types of claims dominate the field. First, eighteen of the cases
involve as-applied challenges to restrictions on a particular landowner's
groundwater use.' 67 Day typifies this type of litigation.1 68 Second, nine of
the cases challenge states' attempts to change groundwater laws. Typical
of this second category is Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District, another Texas case involving a facial challenge to
the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act.1 69 The remaining cases involve a wide

166. Because of the small sample size, one probably should not draw too many conclusions from
the numbers from specific states. The relatively high number of Nevada cases, for example, may
simply reflect a few litigious years for the Fallini family rather than some distinctive attribute of
Nevada's law or hydrology. See Fallini, 725 F. Supp. 1113; Fallini, 31 Fed. Cl. 53; Fallini, 56 F.3d
1378. Similarly, three of the four Ohio decisions emerged from the same underlying dispute.
167. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126-27 (describing how the case arose out of a
dispute over a permit application for a new well).

168. 369 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2012).
169. 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996); see also Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968)
(challenging North Dakota's establishment of a prior appropriation regime and declaration that
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variety of circumstances. In a few, groundwater users sought
compensation after government activities-construction projects, for
example-allegedly depleted or polluted their aquifers. 170 In others,
plaintiffs challenged restrictions on their ability to prevent wildlife from
drinking pumped groundwater. 17 Nevertheless, across the field of cases,
the most frequently recurring questions concern governments' ability to
change groundwater law and to restrict individuals' groundwater use.
B. Key Lessons from the Cases
While the geographic distribution and growing number of
groundwater/takings cases are both intriguing, the more important lessons
from the cases arise from their reasoning and outcomes. Below, I describe
several of the central themes.
1. Groundwater Use Rights as Property
One of the first lessons from the cases involves the status of
groundwater use rights as constitutional property. In the American legal
tradition, and particularly in the American west, water rights are
commonly thought of as a subspecies of property rights, and lawyers
commonly believe-or sometimes simply assume-that those rights are
subject to constitutional protection. 72 Nevertheless, in recent years, a few
commentators have questioned that assumption.1 3 They raise a mix of
assertions, arguing both that water rights are not uniformly established as
constitutional property and that constitutionalized water rights are

groundwater not previously appropriated was state property); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D.
1964) (challenging a similar change in South Dakota).
170. See, e.g., Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 2009) (alleging a taking
after the city constructed a sewer pipeline, allegedly causing nearby wells to run dry); In re Town of
Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582, 591-92 (N.H. 2006) (taking alleged by landowners after the state granted a
groundwater withdrawal permit to a water bottling company); Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (claiming a taking where stormwater runoff from an adjacent
parcel allegedly contaminated groundwater beneath the plaintiffs' land).
171. See, e.g., Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122-24 (D. Nev. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that such a restriction would effect a
regulatory taking and therefore was invalid).
172. See Sax, supra note 29, at 260 ("Water rights are property.") (emphasis in original). My own
past thinking exemplifies these assumptions. I drafted Imperial County's briefs in the Allegretti & Co.
appellate litigation, but it never occurred to me to argue that Allegretti lacked any constitutionally
protected right to use groundwater (we did argue that the right was less extensive than Allegretti
claimed), even though that argument, if successful, would have won the case for my client.
173. See, e.g., Zellmer & Harder, supra note 33, at 741 ("[Alppropriators possess a right to
preclude other appropriators from using water, as well as a procedural due process right against
capricious government action, but this is not a full private property right entitled to compensation for a
regulatory taking."); Saxer, supra note 33.
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unjustified in theory and harmful in practice. 17 4 Similar claims sometimes
emerge in litigators' briefs. In the Day litigation, for example, some amici
argued that constitutionalizing a property right to in situ groundwater
would sound the death knell for sensible regulation. 17 5 That view also
finds some support from comparisons with the laws of other countries.
Many have effectively rejected regulatory takings protection for
groundwater use rights, or for property rights more generally, without
losing their ability to support advanced resource-based and industrial
economies. 176

Nevertheless, the American groundwater/takings cases provide little
support for arguments against treating water rights as constitutional
property. Many cases clearly state that groundwater use rights qualify as
constitutional property and are protected by the takings doctrine.1 7 7 Day
exemplifies these cases, as does McNamara v. City of Rittman, a recent
Ohio Supreme Court case. 17 8 There, the court unequivocally concluded,
"Ohio recognizes that landowners have a property interest in the
groundwater underlying their land and that governmental interference with

174. Zelimer and Harder begin by emphasizing decisions suggesting some continued ambiguity
about the constitutional status of water rights, and then conclude, based on a web-of-interests
metaphor, that water rights should not receive constitutional protection. Zellmer & Harder, supra note
33, at 732-41. Saxer's argument is both doctrinal and functional. She cites the many traditional legal
restrictions on water rights and the practical need to protect public interests in water as reasons against
treating water rights as traditional property. See generally Saxer, supra note 33.
175. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Angela Garcia and Environmental Defense Fund at 9,
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) ("[G]roundwater
conservation districts, and particularly the EAA, would be rendered unworkable."). Similar rhetoric
has accompanied groundwater litigation in other states. See, e.g., Fiona Smith, Courts Tackle Water
Ownership: A Sacramento County Case Could Determine if River is 'Real Property', S.F. DAILY J.,
Aug. 2, 2011, at 1 (quoting an environmental attorney's warning that "[i]f water became real property,
then potentially any limitation or control on the use of water for the public good would become a
compensable taking").
176.

See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:

LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 139-47 (2006) (discussing groundwater use
litigation in Germany); Dr. Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada,
5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 477 ("[Plroperty rights receive minimal protection under
Canadian law."); Kevin Guerin, Protection Against Government Takings: Compensation for
Regulation? 16-17 (New Zealand Treasury, Working Paper No. 02/18, 2002), available at http://www
.treasury.govt.nz/publicaions/research-policy/wp/2002/02-18/twpO2-18.pdf (discussing New Zealand's
approach, which leaves compensation to the discretion of the legislature).
177. See, e.g., City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 792 (Cal. 1921) ("The
water in all these lands, therefore, is private property, and will remain private property until it is taken
from the owners of the land and devoted to public use."); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578,
594 (Kan. 1962) ("The privilege of using water is unquestionably an element of the value of the land.
To take away that right might be tantamount in a semi-arid country to confiscation of property."); City
of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
8, 2006) ("We agree that the right to use groundwater is a valuable property right.").
178. McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640,643 (Ohio 2005).
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that right can constitute an unconstitutional taking., 179 A few cases do not
address the issue, some address it ambiguously,180 and some have stressed
that the constitutional protection for water rights is weak.181 But I found
only one decision that clearly rejected the idea of a property right in
groundwater. In Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., a 1979
decision, the Florida Supreme Court concluded a discussion of
groundwater rights with the emphatic statement that "[t]his 'right to use' is
not 'private property' as contemplated by article X, section 6, [of the]
Florida Constitution requiring full compensation before taking for a public
purpose. ' ,11 2 That statement is entirely consistent with conceptions of
water rights as sub-constitutional property. But within American
groundwater jurisprudence, that statement also is unique.
Of course, even if groundwater use rights traditionally count as
property rights, not every takings plaintiff will have a valid claim to hold
such rights. In some states, the underlying right extends only to reasonable
uses on overlying land, or to a reasonable share of the resource, and a
plaintiff whose use exceeds those constraints lacks a colorable claim to
own the property that forms the basis for her takings claim. 83 Similarly, in

179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005) ("A right to
appropriate surface water however, is not an ownership of property. Instead, the water is viewed as a
public want and the appropriation is a right to use the water."). While this language seems consistent
with the idea that water rights are not property at all, it also is consistent with the idea-which is
present in most states' systems of water law-that constitutionally protected property interests in water
exist, but those interests take the form of use rights rather than of direct ownership of the physical
water. See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) ("It is laid down by our law writers, that the
right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage
of its use.") (emphasis in original).
181. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 493 (Haw. 2000) ("Usufructuary
water rights, in sum, 'have always been incomplete property rights .... ') (quoting A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 3-153 (2000)). One federal court decision from Arizona
appears to conclude, albeit with some ambiguity, that Arizona landowners lack any constitutionally
protected interest in the groundwater beneath their lands. See Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270,
1277 (D. Ariz. 1982) ("The only interpretation of Arizona law open to this Court is that a landowner
has no interest in underlying groundwater prior to its capture.") aff'd, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983).
But the Arizona case upon which this federal decision relied did not go quite that far. See Town of
Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324 (Ariz. 1982). Prescott held (1) that overlying
landowners did not have vested ownership of the physical water beneath their lands, and instead only
held usufructuary rights to use that water; and (2) that those usufructuary rights were appropriately
subject to regulation. Id. at 1328-29. That is not the same as holding that landowners had no
constitutionally protected water right at all. A usufructuary right can be a constitutionally protected
property right, and under American takings doctrine, most, if not all, constitutionally protected
property rights are subject to regulation. Consequently, Prescott does not actually state the categorical
rule that Cherry appears to have extracted from it.
182. 371 So. 2d 663, 670 (Fla. 1979).
183. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 467-85 (describing groundwater management
doctrines). The presence of such "reasonable use" limitations provides an additional reason why
takings claims in those jurisdictions should rarely prevail. Government restrictions will usually involve

2013]

TAKING GROUNDWATER

western states that have integrated groundwater use rights into their prior
appropriation systems, an overlying landowner may not have any property
interest in the use of groundwater beneath his land, and a junior
appropriator has no property right to uses that interfere with his seniors. 184
Consequently, a key litigation issue in several groundwater/takings cases
has been whether the plaintiff actually owns the allegedly taken
property. 185 But even when courts have answered that question in the
negative, they generally have done so because that particular plaintiff
lacked a property interest, not because
the state excludes groundwater use
86
rights from the realm of property.
Obviously that finding is not fatal to the normative or theoretical
arguments against constitutionalizing groundwater rights, or water rights
more generally. Sometimes historical practices are misguided, and
sometimes precedent should be overturned.1 87 But the prevalence of
constitutionally protected groundwater rights nevertheless creates two
challenges for arguments against treating water rights as property. First,
while sometimes property law traditions merely reflect the unjust power
dynamics of an earlier age, on many other occasions they do reflect
received wisdom and traditions born of experience. 88 Second, stability in
property law, as in most areas of law, is valuable in its own right; change
can disrupt expectations and plans. 89 For both of those reasons, the

trying to strike a reasonable balance among competing uses. But, as discussed in more detail below
and in Part I1, there is little basis for granting groundwater use rights heightened takings protection
even in jurisdictions that do not include a reasonable use element in their system of groundwater
rights.
184. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 485-87 (describing the application of prior
appropriation doctrine to groundwater).
185. See, e.g., Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 731-34 (N.D. 1968) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to state laws because the challenger lacked a vested right to groundwater beneath his land);
see also Sierra Nevada SW Enters. v. King, No. 3:10 -CV-579-RCJ-RAM, 2011 WL 3204737, at *10
(D. Nev. July 27, 2011) ("[T]he Court dismisses Plaintiff's takings claim because there is no taking for
the denial of a permit for the approval of stand-alone water rights where such approval would be in
derogation of other prior appropriated rights."); Kobobel v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 249 P.3d
1127, 1133-38 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting a takings claim because the groundwater users lacked
any property right to pump where that pumping would interfere with the rights of more senior
appropriators).
186. See, e.g., Kobobel, 249 P.3d. at 1137 n.9 ("[I]t is possible to assert a valid takings claim in a
water rights context."); Sierra Nevada S.W. Enterprises, 2011 WL 3204737, at *10 ("Plaintiff does
have a property right in his appropriated water rights.").
187. Historic laws allowing people to hold other people as property, whether as slaves or through
marriage, provide obvious examples.
188. For example, many of our most commonplace property rights, like fee simple ownership or
leaseholds, reflect a shared understanding that some certainty and transferability in property rights can
facilitate individual security and economic growth.
189. See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law,
2000 UTAH L. REv. 1, 2 ("There is a longstanding and very powerful argument that the stability of
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prevalence of a legal practice therefore should create a presumptionalbeit a weak and rebuttable one-that continuing the practice makes some
sense.
2. Deference to Regulatory Authority
The tradition of treating water rights as constitutional property also
allows us to consider whether the perceived dangers of constitutionally
protected water rights have come to fruition. Among the commentators
and litigants who have argued against constitutionalizing water rights, the
primary fear has been that constitutional protection of water rights will
inevitably lead to severe restrictions on governments' ability to regulate
those rights. As one environmental group's amicus brief in the Day
litigation direly put it, "[i]f this theory were to prevail in this Court,
groundwater conservation in Texas would be finished."'1 90 In the Day
litigation, those warnings led, somewhat ironically, to a counterargument
from the plaintiffs' supporting amici, some of whom took pains to explain
that property rights can be and routinely are subject to extensive regulatory
oversight. 9 But in the broader property rights debate, the
environmentalists' fears are almost exactly concordant with property
rights advocates' hopes. For most property rights advocates, constitutional
property rights are a means to anti-regulatory ends.1 92 That debate raises
the question: have past courts' treatment of groundwater use rights as
constitutional property led to doctrinal restrictions on groundwater
regulation?
There is little evidence that they have. In the pool of decisions
available on Lexis and Westlaw, government defendants have done quite
well, winning the vast majority of the cases. 93 Even where government

property is essential to economic well-being.").
190. Post-Submission Amicus Brief of the Texas Alliance of Groundwater Districts at 1, Edwards
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964).
191. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mesa Water, L.P. at 26, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369
S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) ("But the fact remains that regulation and ownership are not
mutually exclusive.").
192.

See

CHARLES

FRIED,

ORDER AND

LAW: ARGUING

THE REAGAN

REVOLUTION-A

FIRSTHAND AccoUNT 183 (1991) (explaining how conservative activists hoped "to use the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and
property"); Eduardo Moisbs Pefnalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership
in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 282 (2004) (discussing the close relationship
between the property-rights movement and opposition to environmental regulation).
193. Government defendants lost the following cases: Williamson v. Guadalupe Cnty.
Groundwater Conservation Dist., 343 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598-99 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the
case was ripe, and denying a motion to dismiss); Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989),
aff'd on other grounds, Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992); City Mill Co. v. Honolulu
Sewer & Water Comm'n, 30 Haw. 912, 947 (Haw. 1929); Jones v. East Lansing-Meridian Water &
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defendants have lost, the loss has often been on a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, and the case has continued onward.1 94 Only four
courts have found a taking. 195 In two of these cases, the court did not order
payment of damages, 96 and in one controversy, a subsequent damages
claim failed.1 97 Only in Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the most
recent case out of Texas, has a court found a taking and concluded that
compensation should be paid. 98 Case outcomes cannot reveal all the ways
in which constitutionalized water rights are affecting water management,
for fears of takings claims may affect regulatory approaches even if few
takings claims actually prevail. 99 Nevertheless, case outcomes do offer at
least some evidence of actual practices, and these outcomes therefore
provide ample reason to think that constitutionalized groundwater rights
can coexist with robust government regulation.
The reasoning of the decisions also supplies ample support for
government regulatory authority. In decision after decision, courts have
explained, often in great detail, the essential importance of groundwater

Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640
(Ohio 2005) (finding that plaintiffs had a property interest in subterranean groundwater); Edwards
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (finding an ownership interest in subterranean
groundwater); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838
(Aug. 28, 2013) (finding a taking); and Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662
N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 2003) (unpublished opinion reversing summary judgment in favor of the
government defendant).
194. See, e.g., Williamson, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99 (holding that the case was ripe, and denying
a motion to dismiss); McNamara, 838 N.E. 2d. 640 (finding that plaintiffs had a property interest in
subterranean groundwater); Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (finding an ownership interest in subterranean
groundwater); Lesaffre Yeast Corp., 662 N.W.2d 678 (unpublished opinion reversing summary
judgment in favor of the government defendant)
195. See Fallini, 725 F. Supp. at 1113; Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838; City Mill Co., 30
Haw. at 947; Jones, 296 N.W.2d at 202. Fallini involved restrictions on a rancher's ability to keep
wild animals from drinking from groundwater-fed troughs. The court held that the restrictions were

arbitrary and capricious in part because they would create a taking. In City Mill Co., the court set aside
a restriction on new well construction, reasoning that to prohibit new construction while allowing
continuation of existing pumping would take property rights. In Jones, the plaintiffs argued,
successfully, that the defendant authority had taken their rights by pumping in excess of its own rights.
196. In Jones, the court did remand for determination of damages. 296 N.W.2d at 205. However,
Jones involved government acting as a competing consumptive user of groundwater, not as a regulator.
Id.
197. See Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53 (1994), vacated and remanded by Fallini v.
United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
198. 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838.
199. See ECHfEVERRIA, supra note 150, at 5 (noting a tendency to react to potential takings claims
by waiving regulations).
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use regulation. For example, in Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst,200 the
Arizona Supreme Court observed:
The supply of ground water within the territorial boundaries of the
state, or any particular groundwater basin therein, is not unlimited
and even though in some instances the limits thereof may be
difficult to apprehend, ultimately and inevitably at one time or
another it will become necessary to restrict the use merely
because
20 1
the available users and uses exceed the available supply.
Similarly, in Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources
District, 202 the Nebraska Supreme Court succinctly summarized the
prevailing view when it concluded "placing limitations upon withdrawals
of ground water in times of shortage is a proper exercise of the State's
police power., 20 3 Neither statement is at all exceptional.
In accordance with that view, courts have often affirmed the ability of
state legislatures and local governments to change state groundwater law,
even where the changes effectively infringe rights that previously were
unlimited. That affirmation comes from old and new cases, from relatively
conservative and relatively liberal states, and from states with all sorts of
common-law groundwater doctrines. 2 04 For example, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recently rejected a challenge to regulatory legislation
imposing new limits on groundwater use. It premised its decision largely
on "[t]he general rule ... that the Legislature may restrict the use and

enjoyment of the state's water resources by exercise of its police power for
the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare without
compensating the property owner., 20 5 In Ernst, the 1955 Arizona Supreme
Court case quoted above, the court stressed the same point, stating: "We
do not doubt that it is the proper sphere of the legislature, in the interest of
the general welfare, to say when that time [for groundwater use

200. 291 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1955). Ernst involved a challenge to state laws that restricted the drilling
of new wells in areas with groundwater shortages. Id.
201. Id. at 770. See also F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1174 (Kan. 1981)
(describing how demands placed upon the Ogallala Aquifer justify legislative intervention).
202. 512 N.W.2d 642 (Neb. 1994). Bamford involved a challenge to a water district's cease and
desist order; the order had prohibited pumping from nine wells located within a "control area." Id.
203. Id. at 652.
204. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492-95 (Haw. 2000) (noting that
such transitions have been found constitutional in many states); Natural Res. Comm'n v. Amax Coal
Co., 638 N.E.2d 418, 429 (Ind. 1994) ("The State can regulate the use of property without destroying
rights in that property."); City of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL
2270494, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006) (acknowledging that groundwater use rights are
property rights, but adding: "we do not agree that home rule cities lack the authority to enact
ordinances that affect property rights").
205. Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842, 855 (Okla. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
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restrictions] has arrived .... ,,20620
Again, neither statement is anomalous.20
Moreover, a contrary narrative, in which groundwater use regulation
represents government run amok, makes rare appearances in groundwater
decisions almost exclusively in dissents.20 8
Finally, the cases have either ignored or affirmatively rejected modes
of takings analysis that would drastically limit governmental regulatory
authority. The most prominent example of this rejection involves
arguments that water use restrictions should be analyzed as potential
physical takings. Those arguments have emerged most prominently in
cases involving surface waters, and, as discussed above, they gained a
narrow foothold in two recent decisions, one from the Federal Court of
Claims and the other from the Federal Circuit. 20 9 Building on those
successes, plaintiffs in groundwater/takings cases have argued that a
physical takings analysis is the traditional and appropriate method for
analyzing a regulatory restriction on groundwater use. 210 But they have
never succeeded. In the full set of regulatory groundwater/takings cases
available on Lexis and Westlaw, not one has used a physical takings
analysis, or has endorsed any other sort of categorical takings test.2 11 The
cases that have addressed the issue have squarely rejected that approach.21 2

206. Sw. Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 770 (Ariz. 1955).
207. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 589 (Kan. 1962) (affirming "the basic
power of the legislature to modify and change common-law rules with respect to water usage").
208. See, e.g., id. at 596 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) ("If such arbitrary exercise of the police power
of the state withstands the federal constitutional test of due process, the formula has been found, and
the precedent is established, by which all private property within Kansas may be communized without
cost to the state.") (emphasis in original); F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1175
(Kan. 1981) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) ("Application of this rule under the Act for the purported
purpose of preventing waste and conserving natural resources is, of course, nothing more than a
redistribution of the wealth to the favored few after the initial confiscation of the landowner's vested
rights to his property.").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41 (discussing Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001), and Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); but see CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1246-48 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (holding that a water use restriction did not qualify as a physical taking).
210. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 125, 129 (Ct. App.
2006); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners and Respondents
Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel at 22-24, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012)
(No. 08-0964).
211. In Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2003) (unpublished opinion), a Wisconsin appellate court concluded that a plaintiffs claim should
have been analyzed as a potential physical takings claim. Id. at *3.That case did not involve
regulatory activity, however. The defendant government entity had allegedly contaminated the
plaintiffs' groundwater by building a tunnel. Id. at * 1.
212. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 839 (Tex. 2012) ("The first categoryinvolving a physical invasion of property-does not apply to the present case."); Allegretti & Co. v.
Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 130-31 (Ct. App. 2006) ("County's action with respect to

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:253

The traditional judicial approach therefore creates challenges for those
arguing that water rights should be categorically excluded from, or
categorically favored in, takings law.213 On the one hand, the cases show
that constitutionalized property and regulation are compatible.214 That
should not be particularly surprising, for the status of land as constitutional
property and the authority of government to regulate land use both have
been largely beyond dispute throughout our nation's history. 5 The
groundwater cases simply show that the same balancing act is possibleand, indeed, traditional-for water.21 6 On the other hand, the cases
demonstrate the absence of any historical basis or judicial precedent for
analyzing regulatory restrictions on groundwater use as potential physical
takings, or under any other sort of test that provides groundwater rights
with more protection than other forms of property. Groundwater cases
have presented courts with dozens of opportunities to take those
approaches, and in the pool of decisions available on Lexis and Westlaw,
the courts have uniformly declined them.21
Nevertheless, relative consistency of past practices does not ensure that
future cases will use similar analytical methods or reach the same
outcomes. Initially, an ambiguity generated by past groundwater/takings
cases may afford future courts some flexibility to pursue different
approaches.21 8 In many cases, courts place heavy emphasis on what they

Allegretti in the present case-imposition of a permit condition limiting the total quantity of
groundwater available for Allegretti's use-cannot be characterized as or analogized to the kinds of
permanent physical occupancies or invasions sufficient to constitute a categorical physical taking.").
213. The cases do not create any problem for, and indeed support, those who argue that water
rights are constitutional property, but that a takings claim involving water rights should be quite
difficult to prove. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
214. For a broader comparative argument in support of this point, see ALEXANDER, supra note
176, at 2342.
215. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1252 (1996) (arguing that land use regulation has been pervasive since the colonial
era).
216. Again, the cases do not undermine arguments that water fights, though constitutional
property, should be the basis for successful takings claims less often than rights in land. The authors
who put forth those arguments generally ground them in traditional takings doctrine. Their argument is
that because water rights generally are subject to more factual and legal limitations than other forms of
property, Lucas and Penn Central analyses should very rarely lead courts to conclude that takings have
occurred.
217. For discussion of case outcomes, see supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
218. Another interesting uncertainty concerns the property interest the court should use when
measuring the extent of a regulation's impact. Some courts have treated the groundwater use right as
an independent right, see, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App.
2006), while others have treated the groundwater use right as part of a landownership ight. See, e.g.,
City of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs. L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App.
2006). Though both of these cases denied takings claims, the difference could be crucially important.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 106546 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing
the implications of this "denominator" problem).
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describe as a compelling government interest in groundwater regulation.2 19
For example, in Southwest Engineering Company v. Ernst, the Arizona
Supreme Court justified its rejection of a takings claim by noting that
"[w]here the public interest is thus significantly involved, the preferment
of that interest over the property interest of the individual even to the
extent of its destruction is a distinguishing characteristic of the exercise of
the police power. ,2 2 0 That emphasis is consistent with older Supreme
Court takings cases that treat the government's police power to regulate
harms as a powerful defense. 221 But more recently, the Supreme Court has
seemed-at least sometimes-to back away from this sort of reasoning. In
Lucas, for example, the Court reversed a South Carolina Supreme Court
decision premised on the government's police power to prevent harm, and
Justice Scalia pointedly argued that harm-based reasoning is too malleable
to be workable.22 2 Then, in Lingle, the entire court agreed that a takings
analysis generally "presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit
of a valid public purpose" and instead should focus on the impact to the
plaintiff.223 None of these recent cases clearly removes government
interests from takings analysis, and indeed, many judges and
commentators have argued that a coherent and just takings doctrine cannot
possibly compel courts to ignore why the government did what it did. 4
But they do suggest a reduced, and perhaps somewhat ambiguous, role for
government interests in the takings analysis. 225 Even that change might

219. See, e.g., Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964); Peterson v. Dep't of Ecology,
596 P.2d 285, 290 (Wash. 1979) ("The relevant inquiry in such a challenge is whether the regulatory
scheme is an exercise of police power rather than one of condemnation."); supra text accompanying
notes 200-07 (discussing additional decisions affirming public regulatory authority).
220. 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955); Grimes, 127 N.W.2d at 711 (quoting this language from
Ernst). For a brief summary of the basic dispute in Ernst, see supra note 200.
221. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1915) (invoking the police power
as grounds to sustain a regulation despite severe economic impacts).
222. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-27 (1992).
223. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); see Fenster, supra note 123, at 535
("Lingle clarifies that in all cases, courts considering a regulatory takings claim may consider only the
challenged regulation's effects on property and the rights of ownership, and not the validity of the
regulation and regulatory program itself.").
224. E.g. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the
regulation should be relevant); Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 421
(2010) (also arguing that the purposes of the government's action should be relevant to a takings
analysis); Fenster, supra note 123, at 564-73 (arguing that the "character of the government action"
analytical prong does and should allow for such analysis); John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn
Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 175-76 (2005).
225. See Rubenfeld, supra note 124, at 1100 (describing the Court's "simultaneous attraction
toward and repulsion from" harm-based analysis).
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afford an opportunity for courts to revisit the basic compromise enshrined
in past groundwater/takings decisions.
Heightening the temptation to change course may be the emergence in
groundwater/takings cases of a new set of governmental interests. Ernst
and its contemporary cases were not environmental law cases, at least as
we now would understand the concept.226 Instead, the regulatory schemes
at issue simply shifted between alternative regimes for refereeing (or not
refereeing) groundwater disputes among competing human users. But
many of the more recent groundwater cases do have an environmental
component. 227 Some involve the direct application of environmental
regulations, and others involve three-way competitions among human
users and environmental needs, but in either circumstance, government is
limiting groundwater use partly to preserve environmental values. 228 To
some judges and commentators, that shift may make no difference at all,
but to others it may be quite important. 229 A distinct lack of sympathy for
environmental regulation pervades many of the conservative Supreme
Court justices' recent opinions, both within and outside the takings field,
and the broader property rights movement is in large part a reaction to the
emergence of environmental controls.230 Consequently, judges who might

226. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02 (describing the disputes in these cases). In Ernst,
for example, the Arizona Supreme Court clearly explained that the main threat was to agriculture, not
the natural environment:
The legislative finding that the exhaustion of ground water by excessive withdrawals
threatens to destroy one of the principal economic resources of the state to the consequential
serious injury of all is not disputed. Such a conclusion is obviously justified because
unrestrained use must inevitably result either in complete exhaustion of the state's ground
water so that in the end the lands dependent thereon will revert to their desert state or in the
lowering of water tables so that the increased cost of pumping will reduce these lands to a
marginal or submarginal condition.
Sw. Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955) (footnote omitted).
227. For example, the dispute in Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct.
App. 2006) originated because the County asked the landowner to submit to environmental review of
his new well. See also supra text accompanying notes 38-44 (describing how environmental
restrictions led to the legislative scheme challenged in multiple Edwards Aquifer takings cases);
Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842, 848 (Okla. 2006) (describing environmental impacts that
helped create the need for the challenged regulations).
228. See, e.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818-19 (Tex. 2012) (summarizing
the purposes of the regulatory scheme for the Edwards Aquifer).
229. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN.L. REV. 1433, 1438-39 (1993) (explaining Lucas as a direct
reaction to the ideas of the environmental movement).
230. See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("The position
taken in this case by the Federal Government ...would have put the property rights of ordinary
Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees."); Rapanos v.

United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (lamenting "[t]he burden of federal regulation" of wetlands,
and claiming that "the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an
enlightened despot"); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
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have sympathized with governments' need to protect human consumptive
users from each other may have very different reactions when the
regulatory regime's purpose is wetlands preservation or endangered
species protection. 211
Of course, courts-and, perhaps more importantly, legislators-do not
need doctrinal instability in order to move the law in a new direction. The
fact that our legal and political culture has traditionally supported
regulatory oversight of groundwater use rights does not mean it will be
nearly so deferential in the future. Cultures change, skepticism of
government regulation remains prevalent, and litigators and some judges
already are vigorously advocating for a different future approach. 232 For
that reason, the Day decision might someday turn out to be just as limiting
for Texas groundwater regulation as its detractors currently fear, and
copycat decisions might emerge across the American landscape. Indeed,
there already are hints of such a transformation. In early 2011, apparently
for the first time in American groundwater/takings jurisprudence, a court
ordered a government defendant to pay compensation for a taking of
groundwater use rights. 2 1' Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority arose out
of a fact pattern much like that in Day, or, for that matter, in a great many
other groundwater/takings cases. Agricultural landowners challenged
regulatory limits on their ability to pump, and those limits in turn derived
from the well-documented shortages plaguing the aquifer.234 This time,
however, the result was different: the trial court found a taking,235 and in
August 2013, Texas' Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.236 For the

(characterizing regulatory protection of wetlands as "malefaction"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding that the
hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the
point of financial ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use.").
231. See Penalver, supra note 192, at 282 (discussing how this hostility to environmental
regulation has shaped the "property rights" movement and affected the Court); Richard J. Lazarus,
Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1414-18 (1993) (discussing how
conservative opposition to environmental regulation influenced the emergence of modern takings
doctrine).
232. See Underkuffler, supra note 132, at 731-32 (describing Justice Scalia's vision of takings
doctrine).
233. Second Amended Final Judgment, Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., Cause No. 06-11-18170
(Medina Cnty., Tex. Dist. Ct., filed Mar. 25, 2011).
234. See Cross-Appellants' Brief at 4-13, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV ) (summarizing the factual basis for the Braggs'

argument).
235. Second Amended Final Judgment, Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., Cause No. 06-11-18170
(Medina Cnty., Tex. Dist. Ct., filed Mar. 25, 2011).
236. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838. The
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plaintiffs, it was a dramatic win with a rather promising damages formula:
the court held that the taken property was not some reasonable share of the
aquifer's water but instead "the unlimited use of water to irrigate a
commercial-grade pecan orchard. ' ,2 17 As of this writing, the time for
appeals has not run, and the Edwards Aquifer Authority may soon be back
before the Texas Supreme Court.
III. GROUNDWATER, TAKINGS, AND PROPERTY THEORIES

The central conclusion of the preceding section is that traditional
groundwater/takings jurisprudence tracks traditional takings law, and that
such jurisprudence has allowed extensive government regulation of
groundwater rights. Nevertheless, as the Bragg litigation signals,
arguments for a different approach are still very much in play, and some
judges and legislators may well be tempted to chart a different course. If
lawmakers do entertain that possibility, they probably will seek guidance
from broader principles of property law. For that reason, this section asks
the basic question: in light of key theories of property law, what approach
to takings cases involving groundwater makes sense?
The analysis that follows comes with a caveat. I do not base it on the
premise that judges or legislators, let alone lay people, ground their
approach to takings doctrine in any discrete property theory.238 Even
attorneys typically derive their notions of property as much from historical
contingencies and habitual conventional wisdom as from theories, and
they are more likely to use an amalgamation of multiple theories than a
single construct.239 Moreover, few, if any, property theorists can purport to

have found a coherent and unified theory of property law, and many
instead craft their concepts of property by drawing on multiple theoretical
traditions.2 40 Nevertheless, property theories underpin almost any lawyer's
or judge's conceptualization of takings doctrine, even if those theories are
often blended, underdeveloped, or indeterminate, and such theories
certainly will influence the future development of groundwater law. 24' An

appellate court did remand the case for a new damages calculation.
237. Id.at*87.
238. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 161, 165 (1996) ("[Finding any coherent, underlying understanding of
constitutionally cognizable property in Supreme Court takings cases is a challenging task.").
239.

See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND

WHAT WE OWN (2011) (describing the historic evolution of various property law concepts).
240. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36 (drawing on natural law, utilitarian, and originalist
arguments to support a theory of takings); Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 238, at 193 (arguing that
property is best understood "a bipartite entity" supported by two competing conceptual models).
241. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PERALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
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exploration of property theories' implications for groundwater
242
management therefore can help inform those future developments.
A Natural Rights

For lawyers and judges seeking to resolve groundwater/takings
controversies, one potential source of guidance is a natural rights theory of
property. Such a theory posits that law should reflect "a prepolitical and
prelegal conception of property," which derives not from the compromises
of political bodies, the contingencies of history, or even calculations of
economic utility, but instead from some deeper set of foundational
premises. 24' Such theories are not presently in fashion among legal
scholars, many of whom question the notion that any property right could
exist prior to its endorsement by a political and legal community. 244 But
the notion of natural property rights clearly is not absurd, for our society's
concepts of political liberty and human rights draw upon similar ideas,
245
with
less also
controversy.
times conceptions
in our nation's
history, natural
rights much
theories
dominated At
judges'
of property
law. 246

THEORY xi (2012) ("At the base of every single property debate are competing theories of property-

different understandings of what property is, why we have it, and what its proper limitations are.");
see, e.g., Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 238, at 194-202 (explaining how competing theories
underlie the Court's analysis in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council).
242. Another caveat concerns the scope of the analysis. An extraordinary volume of writing
considers the conceptual foundations of property law, and considering all of the permutations of theory
within those articles and books would require much more than just a few pages of analysis in the final
section of a law review article. The pages that follow therefore will focus only on the implications of a
representative range of classic property theories.
243. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1549, 1560 (2003); see City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006) ("Believed to
be derived fundamentally from a higher authority and natural law, property rights were so sacred that
they could not be entrusted lightly to 'the uncertain virtue of those who govern."') (quoting Parham v.
Justices of Decatur Cnty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (Ga. 1851)). See also Paul J. Otterstedt, A
Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TUX. REV. L. & POL. 25 (2002). For an argument
that utility and natural law actually are closely intertwined, see Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian
Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989).
244. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007) (arguing that property cannot exist without political and legal
affirmation); Eduardo M. Pefnalver, Restoring the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J. 732, 763-64
(2007) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004)) (discussing the widespread distrust of natural rights theories among left-leaning
academics); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
573-74 (1972) (arguing that the term "natural law" is "an empty vessel into which one can pour almost
anything").
245. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths
to be self-evident . .

.").

246. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 18 (1990) (describing how American judges in the late nineteenth century

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:253

Even today, those notions continue to exert a powerful hold on popular
imaginations, litigators' rhetoric, and, sometimes, judicial decisions.24 In
short, natural rights theories, though often criticized, remain relevant.
Some natural rights theories also have clear implications for
groundwater/takings debates. For example, many libertarian-leaning
thinkers argue that a principle of first possession should transcend political
affirmation. 248 Consequently, they argue, any regulatory restriction that
does not protect the value held by all present property owners should be
treated as a taking. 249 For groundwater use rights, the implications of that

theory are fairly clear.250 Such a conception of property rights would not
preclude all regulation of groundwater, for sometimes regulation can
enhance everyone's property values by precluding a tragedy of the
commons. 251 But that conception of natural rights would place far greater
limits on the ability of government to revise rights in ways that benefit
some extractive users at the expense of others.25 2 And, perhaps even more
clearly, it would limit the ability of government to impose environmental

perceived many legal principles as "neutral and pre-political"); Claeys, supra note 243 (describing the
influence of natural rights theories upon nineteenth century jurisprudence).
247. One passage from a brief in the Texas groundwater litigation captures particularly well the
sense that property rights should transcend economic analysis. See Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel's
Response to Petition for Review by the State of Texas at 6, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369
S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) ("It is disappointing to these Texans that the Executive Branch
is taking an official position ... that it will cost too much to recognize the right of private property.
There is a trail of blood from the venerable Alamo to the San Jacinto Monument 200 miles away that
resulted in our Texas Constitution. How much was that cost?") (emphasis omitted).
248. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979).
While the links between libertarian property ideals and natural rights theory are close, not all
libertarians derive their views from natural rights, and not all natural rights theorists are libertarian. For
example, Epstein also draws heavily on utilitarianism and on arguments grounded in theories of
constitutional interpretation. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36. Likewise, natural rights ideals also
can support communitarian conceptions of property. See Penalver, supra note 192, at 279.
249. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36. Claeys argues for a similar rule, though his argument
is grounded partly in a labor-based natural rights theory. See Claeys, supra note 243, at 1572-73
(arguing that a regulatory restriction is a taking unless it "restricts the use rights of every person in
order to enlarge both the personal rights and freedom of action of everyone regulated"). For discussion
of the influence of such views on United States Supreme Court decisions, see supra notes 131-32 and
supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
250. That theory would still raise questions about what steps are necessary to establish possession
of a groundwater right. Is mere landownership sufficient, or must one actually use the groundwater?
One possible answer to this question would be to look to the various ways state law defines
groundwater rights, and to establish different first possession standards in states with correlative,
appropriative, and rule-of-capture regimes. That approach, however, would rely on political and
historical factors to set the bounds of a purportedly natural right, which seems paradoxical.
251. See Claeys, supra note 243, at 1572-73 (arguing that a regulation is not a taking "if it
restricts the use rights of every person in order to enlarge both the personal rights and freedom of
action of everyone regulated").
252. See id. at 1573 (arguing that traditional natural law theories would lead to a takings finding
"if some individuals lose more than their equal share of use rights without gain").
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restrictions upon groundwater use, unless those benefits brought offsetting
benefits to the restricted users.

251

Many advocates and commentators find that theory compelling, and
similar notions seem to inform many prominent takings cases. 254 As
anyone who teaches property-related subjects quickly learns, the idea that
existing property rights should transcend political control also continues to
exert a powerful hold on many Americans' conceptions of property law.255
Nevertheless, there are two problems with applying this particular natural
rights theory to groundwater use. The first problem is that this is not the

only natural rights theory vying for attention, and the alternative theories
would lead to very different outcomes. The second problem is the absence
of any compelling basis for choosing this particular natural rights theory
over its competitors.

One of those competing natural rights theories would ground property
rights in the intuitive notion that people are entitled to the fruits of their
own labor. 6 Unlike a theory of first possession, that theory implies only
limited protection for groundwater rights. The reason, in a nutshell, is that
very little of groundwater's value derives from the labor of the users who
hope to exploit it. With rare exceptions, people do not create their own
aquifers .
They exist because of natural processes, and they remain

253. See id.
254. See Underkuffler, supra note 132, at 731-32 (tracing the influence of similar views upon
several Supreme Court takings decisions).
255. See Cherie Metcalf, Property Rights and Attitudes toward Environmental Regulation: An
Empirical Investigation 26 (July 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/ssrn com
abstract= 1987028 (finding that an "overwhelming majority of respondents" to a survey administered
in the United States and Canada "feel that compensation ought to be available" in a case where
regulations diminished property values, "despite the fact that there is likely no legal basis to claim it in
either country"); Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION
AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONTROVERSY 286,

286-309

(Nathaniel

Persily

et al.

eds.,

2008)

(summarizing polls showing widespread opposition to uncompensated governmental restrictions on
property use). However, polling also commonly finds widespread support for environmental
regulation, which narrowly suggests that people's answers may reflect the framing of the question, and
more broadly suggests some internal tensions in people's views on property and regulation. See id.;
Kenrick Pierre, The Susceptibility of Property Rights Heuristics to Framing in Public Opinion Polls
and Voting: An Application to Wetlands Policy (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www
.msu.edu/user/schmid/pierre.htm.
256. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 134 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner
Publishing Co., 1947) (1689) ("The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly his.").
257. The exceptions are conjunctive use projects, in which water users pump surface water into
the subsurface and use the resulting aquifers as a storage reservoir, and aquifers created through the
infiltration of excess irrigation water or through leakage from irrigation ditches. See Thompson, supra
note 27, at 308 (describing conjunctive use); David C. Sweigert, Lining Canals in the Border Region:
Can the U.S. Ignore Impacts on Mexico?, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J., Jan. 1991, at 15, 17-18
(1991).
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present in part because of the restraint of other potential users. 8 With
similarly rare exceptions, individual landowners also are not responsible
for the quality of the water in their aquifers. Unless a landowner owns the
entire recharge zone for an aquifer, water quality again will depend upon
natural processes and on the willingness of other landowners to preserve
those processes. 259 Exploiting this natural and societal largesse does
require some labor, for one must build and operate a well and obtain a
permit (at least in some states and for some users). 260 But the role of
individual labor in defining groundwater's value still is far less substantial
than the role of individual labor in giving value to a piece of intellectual
property like a book or a computer program, and the role of natural capital
and community behavior is much greater. Indeed, and in stark contrast to
works like books or computer programs, there is a partially inverse
relationship between individual labor and value, for the value of any
limited natural resource can be diminished by individual exploitation.
Consequently, a natural rights theory grounded in a labor theory points
only to limited protection of individual use rights.
For similar reasons, a third natural rights theory grounded in the public
trust doctrine could fit groundwater, and it too would have implications
rather different from those of a theory of individual first possession. 26 1 The
essence of the public trust doctrine is a principle that certain resources
have an inherently communal character and therefore cannot be entirely
reduced to individual ownership.2 62 Though courts have traditionally
applied the public trust doctrine primarily to surface waterways and to
wildlife,2 63 some of the basic justifications for applying the doctrine to

258. See ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 49-50 (arguing that this objection
undermines labor theory in many contexts).
259. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (noting that many aquifers cross property
boundaries).
260. See generally BRYNER & PURCELL, supra note 109 (summarizing state permitting
requirements).
261. That would not be true if the public were viewed as the first possessor. But advocates of a
first possession-based theory have sometimes resisted recognition of such collective rights. See, e.g.,
Epstein, supra note 248, at 1238. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J.
411 (1987) (arguing that public ownership does have a place in property law).
262. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (explaining the public trust doctrine and arguing
for more extensive use of it); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892).
263. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492-95 (Haw. 2000) (extending a
public trust analysis to groundwater, and noting that "[it] is generally recognized that a simple private
ownership model of property is conceptually inconmpatible with the actualities of natural
watercourses") (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 305-06 (Haw.
1982)). The application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater is now directly at issue in litigation
involving California's Scott River. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583
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those resources fit equally well with groundwater. Like surface water and
wildlife, groundwater crosses physical property boundaries, and its
availability and value depend upon collective action.264 That suggests that
a natural rights approach to groundwater should encompass collective,
public rights, and these public rights should support, not limit, the ability
265
of public entities to apply and occasionally redefine regulatory limits.
That outcome, though equally grounded in a conception of natural rights,
is almost diametrically opposed to the limitations on regulation that
libertarian-leaning natural rights theorists traditionally seek.266
Consequently, a natural rights property theory favors more categorical
treatment of groundwater rights only if we exclusively adopt one
particular version of natural rights theory, in which first individual
possession enjoys exalted status.26 And proponents of that approach have
provided few compelling reasons why it should be adopted instead of its
competitors. 268 For Richard Epstein, for example, the strongest affirmative
argument justifying that approach seems to be that the first possessor took
some initiative and therefore "did something to distinguish himself from
the common mass. ,269 For others, the primary justification seems to be that
John Locke espoused these ideas, and that Locke also heavily influenced
the thinking of the United States' Founders. 270 But the former justification
makes sense only if we assume that the common mass did not itself have
property rights in the thing, or that those property rights were somehow
inferior to those developed by the individual. A public trust approach
provides a powerful and natural rights-based rebuttal to that assumption.
And the latter reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the ample evidence
that the Founders did not view takings law in such a strict libertarian
271
way.

(Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 23, 2010) available at http://www.envirolaw.org/documents/WRIT
PETITIONCOMPLAINT.pdf.
264. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
265. See ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 141-46 (discussing German decisions employing this
reasoning).
266. See supra notes 252-53 (describing conclusions that would follow from a typical libertarian
conception of takings doctrine).
267. I am not arguing that these three variations of natural rights thinking are the only
possibilities. Instead, my only point is that natural rights thinking does not lead to a particular
outcome.

268. See ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 169-72 (describing the challenges of
grounding a theory of regulatory takings in natural rights).
269. Epstein, supra note 248, at 1238. There are also utilitarian arguments favoring a rule of first
possession, including the idea that such a rule will facilitate clear and stable rights.
270. See, e.g., Otterstedt, supra note 243, at 29-41.
271. See John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth -Century Species Protection
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Despite these problems, libertarian-style natural rights theories still
influence takings litigation, and groundwater litigation is no exception. To
argue that one's rights transcend political control and, potentially, any
analysis of their societal utility, and instead exist because of an
uncontestable natural law foundation, is a powerful rhetorical move. But
the theoretical foundations for that move are shaky at best. Natural rights
theory provides little basis for preventing governments from changing
groundwater law or regulating individual owners' groundwater use.
B. Utilitarian Theories
An alternative-and presently more popular, at least among
academics-theory of property rights holds that protecting property makes
sense because that protection increases social welfare.2 2 While natural
rights theories lead in conflicting directions, these utilitarian theories
consistently undermine arguments for categorical treatment of
groundwater takings claims-albeit through a somewhat more
complicated argument than one might initially expect.
According to utilitarian theory, stable property rights encourage labor
and long-term investment, promote social stability and participation, and
generally provide the foundational conditions for a functional economy
and political order.2 3 Similarly, according to some utilitarians, a
compensation requirement can improve efficiency by compelling
government regulators to internalize the costs of the constraints they
impose.2 4 Consequently, several strands of utilitarian theory support
takings protection for individual property rights.2 However, utilitarian

and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REv. 287 (2004) (arguing that the
Founders were familiar and comfortable with water-use regulations); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782
(1995). See also ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 35-56 (arguing that Locke's thinking
was actually at odds with some modern libertarian views).
272. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 50 (7th ed. 2010) ("Utilitarian theory is, without

doubt, the dominant view of property today, at least among lawyers."); ALEXANDER & PENALVER,
supra note 241, at 11-14 (summarizing basic elements of utilitarian theory).
273. See Rose, supra note 189, at 2 (summarizing these arguments); Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1211-12 (1967). For an explanation of ways these dynamics can support
environmental protection, see J. Peter Byrne, Property and Environment: Thoughts on an Evolving

Relationship, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 679, 679-80 (2005).
274. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Commentary, Deterrence and Distribution in the
Law of Takings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997, 999 (1999). For a counterargument that government is not

really sensitive to these incentives, see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics,
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CI. L. REv. 345 (2000).
275. For an overview of utilitarian property theory, see generally ALEXANDER & PENALVER,
supra note 241, at 11-34.
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theory does not support absolute protection of those property rights, for
absolute protection might reify patterns of ownership that promote
inefficient externalities or are otherwise inimical to innovation, progress,
and economic growth.2 6 Similarly, overly strong takings protection might
create a moral hazard problem, for property owners, realizing that any
regulatory limitation will result in compensation, will have incentives to
use property in ways that are dangerous or inefficient.2 Utilitarian theory
therefore directly supports the core compromise of modern takings
doctrine, for it suggests that the doctrine should balance the promotion of
stable property rights against the need to allow some social evolution and
change.2 8
That compromise appears equally appropriate with groundwater. On
the one hand, the classic utilitarian arguments in favor of protecting
property rights appear to apply. Groundwater use has significant social
benefits, but realizing those benefits often requires sustained investment.
An orchard is not worth growing, and a municipal water supply system is
not worth building, if legal access to the water supply is likely to
disappear. Consequently, stable property rights may provide a level of
assurance that makes those sustained investments possible.2 9 On the other
hand, utilitarian theories also clearly support some governmental capacity
for regulatory oversight and legal change. Initially, some legal intervention
may be necessary to maximize the value of groundwater rights. 280 Absent
regulation, individual users have little protection against other competing
users, and the natural consequence is likely to be a classic tragedy of the

276. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 229, at 1449 ("The noncompensation norm in circumstances of
social change reflects a decision to encourage adaptive behavior by rewarding individuals who most
adroitly adjust in the face of change.").
277. See Lawrence Blume et al.,
The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99

Q.J. ECON. 71, 90-91 (1984).
278. How that balance should be struck is, of course, a subject of great debate among utilitarians.
See ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 161 ("[T]here is far less utilitarian consensus about
whether (if ever) the government should compensate property owners when it merely regulates the use
to which they may put their property.").
279. While this argument is intuitive, the willingness of groundwater users to make long-term
investments even where the governing legal regime provides little protection suggests that other
human characteristics-including, perhaps, an inherent excess of optimism-may sustain investment
even where the law provides little protection. See generally Thompson, supra note 6, at 255-65
(exploring why people seem to overinvest in resources with uncertain availability).
280. See Terry L. Anderson & Pamela S. Snyder, Georgia's Groundwater: Own it or Lose it,
SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, May 19, 1996, available at http://www.perc.org/articles/article169.php
(advocating a government role in defining groundwater rights); see generally Harold Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (explaining how property rights often
require delineation to hold value).
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commons. 21 1 Similarly, legal intervention can prevent inefficient
externalities, like rivers pumped dry to sustain the watering of suburban
lawns. 282 For these reasons, courts have readily acknowledged a powerful
utilitarian argument in favor of moving-without paying compensationtoward increased regulation of groundwater use.283
Of course, the primary test of a utilitarian argument need not be the
intuitions of lawyers, for utilitarian arguments lend themselves to
economic analysis.2 84 And while the utilitarian arguments in favor of
groundwater regulation have seemed obvious to jurists, the work of
resource economists adds a surprising twist to the inquiry. In a series of
studies, economists have compared the economic value generated by
aquifers under regulated and non-regulated regimes.2 85 In contravention of
conventional wisdom and judicial rhetoric, they have found that the
positive benefit of regulation is small and sometimes non-existent.286
There are several reasons why this "Gisser-Sdnchez effect" might
exist.28 First, and most importantly, pumping happens sooner in an
unregulated regime, and a regulated regime therefore produces delayed
financial returns. According to standard economic theory, those delayed
returns should be discounted; economists generally assume that capital
produced earlier can be reinvested and can earn a positive return. 288 And a
ten percent discount rate-which some of the key studies did actually
use-can offset many of the economic benefits of sustainable pumping
289
patterns.
economists
have
that as
groundwater Additionally,
availability drops,
agricultural
usersgenerally
will shift found
to higher-value

281. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250.
282. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 99-111 (describing overuse of groundwater in
Massachusetts' Ipswich River watershed).
283. See Sw. Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955) ("The legislative finding that the
exhaustion of ground water by excessive withdrawals threatens to destroy one of the principal
economic resources of the state to the consequential serious injury of all is not disputed. Such a
conclusion is obviously justified .. ") (footnote omitted).
284. There also are factors relevant to a utilitarian analysis that economic analysis cannot easily
qualify.
285. See Phoebe Koundouri, Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource
Management, 18 J. ECON. SURvs. 703, 706-16 (2004) (summarizing multiple studies).
286. Id.
287. The name derives from Micha Gisser & David A. S~Inchez, Competition Versus Optimal
Control in Groundwater Pumping, 16 WATER RESOURCES RES. 638 (1980).
288. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 511 (8th ed. 2011)
(discussing the use of discount rates in cost-benefit policy analyses).
289. See Koundouri, supra note 285, at 715 (documenting the sensitivity of the Gisser-Sttnchez
effect to discount rates).
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crops, typically mitigating some of the economic impact of shortage.
These studies suggest that the utilitarian arguments in favor of
groundwater regulation, and, accordingly, in favor of traditional takings
doctrine, are weaker than courts have traditionally assumed.
Nevertheless, the courts' traditional assumptions still are probably
right, though the analysis is a little bit more complex than those courts
have acknowledged. The studies documenting the Gisser-Sdnchez effect
generally assumed the existence of a relatively homogenous set of
groundwater users.29 1 In many water conflicts, however, the earliest users
also are the lowest value users, for agricultural users often predate urban
competitors who put water to higher-value uses. 29 2 For that reason, a
system that protects water availability for those urban users (or that
provides agricultural users with stable and protected rights that may be
sold to urban users) will often produce higher values. Second, the
economists' discount rates may be unrealistic. 293 A ten percent return on
investment may make sense in a developing economy, where early profits
can be reinvested in capital that will allow huge improvements in farming
practices. 294 In a mature agricultural economy, however, that rate of return
29
seems quite optimistic. 2 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the older
studies finding the Gisser-Sdnchez effect attributed no value to
environmental protection.296 But environmental protection does have
economic value, which groundwater pumping often compromises.29 In the

290. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 171 ("[G]roundwater users have consistently been shown to
adapt to changing resource conditions by reducing pumping, adopting water-saving technologies, and
changing cropping patterns ....").
291. See Koundouri, supra note 285, at 716 (noting that groundwater management may be more
welfare-enhancing in areas with "heterogeneous land productivity").
292. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1873,
1887-88 (2005) (describing value disparity between agricultural water use and use by the
semiconductor industry). Because of different crop prices and water demands, disparities of value also
can exist among agricultural users.
293. For a broad critique of the use of discount rates in policy analysis, see Douglas A. Kysar,
Discounting... on Stilts, 74 U. CHI.L. REV. 119 (2007).
294. M.R. Llamas & P. Martinez-Santos, Editorial, Intensive Groundwater Use: Silent Revolution
and Potential Source of Social Conflicts, 131 J. WATER RESOURCE PLAN. & MGMT. 337, 338 (2005)
(describing how heavy groundwater use can facilitate capital reinvestment and economic growth).
295. See John J. Boland et al., The Theory and Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, in THE
EVOLUTION OF WATER RESOURCE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING 82 (Clifford S. Russell &
Duane D. Baumann eds., 2009) (discussing the debate over appropriate discount rates; most
recommendations are well below ten percent).
296. Encarna Esteban & Jos6 Albiac, Groundwater and Ecosystems Damages: Questioning the
Gisser-Sinchez Effect, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2062, 2064 (2011) (noting that earlier studies focused
only on whether farmers' welfare would be enhanced).
297. See generally GLENNON, supra note 15 (providing examples of the negative environmental
effects of groundwater use); COMM. ON ASSESSING AND THE SERVS. OF AQUATIC AND RELATED
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absence of regulatory restraints, individual pumpers have little incentive to
preserve recharge into downstream surface waterways, even if society as a
whole would derive great value from environmental protection. 298 The
adverse environmental consequences of groundwater use therefore are a
classic externality, and more recent studies that attempt to account for that
externality have reached very different results.29 9
These utilitarian arguments do not argue for unfettered regulatory
control. As many commentators have pointed out, some legal stability may
be a necessary precondition to investment and sustained labor. But a
utilitarian property theory clearly provides no compelling argument for
freezing groundwater rights in their present and largely pre-regulatory
state, for treating restrictions on individual users as potential categorical
takings, or for carving out any other special set of takings laws that
provide heightened protection to groundwater use rights. Instead, with
groundwater, the existence of regulation and the potential for regulatory
change both are necessary preconditions for social and economic value.
C. Theories of Personal and Societal Flourishing
A third set of property theories holds that we should define and protect
property rights in ways that promote human flourishing. Holding property,
according to Margaret Radin's famous theory, helps humans live
personally fulfilling lives.300 Similarly, as theorists dating back to Aristotle
have pointed out, participation in a functioning polity also promotes
human flourishing, and property ownership can encourage such
participation.0 1 If these premises are accurate, then protection against
takings will sometimes be an important precursor to personal fulfillment.
But these theories also imply some limitations upon property rights.
According to Radin's personhood theory, some property rights are more
connected to personal fulfillment than others-for example, a wedding
ring or a home may be more personally important than an absentee-owned
investment property-and takings doctrine need not provide so much
protection to the latter type of right as it does to the former.30 2 Human

TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVS.: TOWARD
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (2005).

298. See Esteban & Albiac, supra note 296, at 2064 (noting that these costs are externalized by
farmers).
299. Id. ("[U]nder regulation, social welfare improves substantially over free market outcomes
when ecosystem damages from depletion are important.").
300. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).
301. See ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 80-101.
302. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 153-56 (1993).
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flourishing theories suggest two additional bases for limiting property
rights. First, because property rights exist through the consent of a
community, that community should have the authority to attach
responsibilities to property ownership and to ask owners to draw upon
their property to support the common good.30 3 Additionally, social and
political participation will be less fruitful and fulfilling if the polity lacks
any ability to consider, and revise, property rights, for the political realm
then would be completely subordinated to the present structure of property
law, even if that structure is inequitable or unwise.30 4 These theories of
personal and societal flourishing therefore necessitate a closer inquiry into
the ways a particular type of property right relates to human fulfillment.
For groundwater rights, that inquiry leads to some interesting
conclusions. The first is that groundwater rights on their own will rarely
merit special protection.30 5 Second, to the extent groundwater rights are
closely linked to human flourishing, and therefore might merit heightened
protection, those links are likely to be inextricably tied to the use of
groundwater on land. That relationship in turn undermines any argument
for takings doctrine protecting individual groundwater rights to any greater
extent than it protects rights in land.30 6 And third, there are powerful
arguments in favor
of a strong societal voice in decisions about
7
groundwater use.
The reasons why groundwater rarely will qualify as "personhood
property" should be fairly obvious. Simply put, very few people have an
emotional connection to groundwater. An aquifer is quite different from a
wedding ring.' °8 It is even different from a surface waterway or spring.
People can and often do form profound personal connections to surface
waterways. 30 9 But (with rare exceptions 310) none of the activities that

303. See ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supra note 241, at 180-82; Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking
Property Seriously, in

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY:

THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY

RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 43, 55 (David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011).
304. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1149-50 (1996)

(reviewing

WILLIAM

A. FISCHEL,

REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).

305. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
307. See infra text accompanying notes 316-30.
308. See Radin, supra note 300, at 959 (listing examples of property that would hold special
personhood status).
309. See, e.g., NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT 161 (1976) ("I am haunted by
waters."). While MacLean's story evinces the profound connections that people feel to waterways, the
fact that the waterways he loved were not private also raises questions about the reach of Radin's
theory. Clearly people can form powerful connections to water and land-connections that are central
to their identity-without holding any individual ownership interest.
310. See David Owen, Notes from the Underground: Florida's Sinkhole Peril, THE NEW YORKER,
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emotionally attach us to rivers and streams are possible with groundwater,
which we cannot swim in, fish in, travel upon, or even see. 311 For most
people, groundwater is an economic resource or a means of sustenance,
and beyond that we give it very little thought.3 12
Of course, when we put groundwater to use, the nature of that

relationship changes. Many farmers' sense of self is defined by working
their land, and working the land may not be possible without groundwater
access. 31 3 Similarly, a rural home or a beloved cottage may be
uninhabitable without a functioning well.31 4 Groundwater and personhood,
in short, can be closely connected. But in all of these circumstances, it is
the mixture of groundwater use rights with land use rights that creates the

value.31 5 And it makes little sense for groundwater rights to have greater
status under takings doctrine than the very land use rights from which
groundwater derivatively takes its "personhood" value. Even if we accept
all the premises of personhood theory, groundwater apart from land should
have lesser, not more exalted, status than land in takings law.
Theories focused on the relationship between societal health and
human flourishing provide even stronger arguments against heightened
takings protection of groundwater rights. To put the point simply,
groundwater use regulation can play a central role in helping a society
thrive. In part, regulation can play that role by reducing conflict, for in the
absence of regulatory control landowners would need some other means
for resolving disputes over groundwater use. 3116 They might succeed. 317 But

Mar. 18, 2013, at 36, 38-40 (describing divers who explore Florida's subterranean caves).
311. This statement applies to groundwater as a hydrologist would define it. In some statesTexas is an example-water can retain its legal classification as groundwater long after it leaves the
ground.
312. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
313. See WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE TABLE: ON FARMING AND FOOD 74-75 (2009)
("Why do farmers farm, given their economic adversities on top of the many frustrations and
difficulties normal to farming? And always the answer is: 'Love. They must do it for love.' Farmers
farm for the love of farming."); JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 50 (Robert J. DeMott ed.,
Penguin Books 1992) (1939) ("If he owns property only so he can walk on it and handle it and be sad
when it isn't doing well, and feel fine when the rain falls on it, that property is him, and some way he's
bigger because he owns it."); supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (describing groundwater's
importance to agriculture).
314. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the extent to which rural America
depends upon groundwater).
315. In fact, it really is the mixture of groundwater use rights with land use rights and personal
property that allows this personal connection, for working the land requires tools and material as well
as land and water. See Penalver, supra note 192, at 261 (pointing out the necessity of personal property
to realize the value of land).
316. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text (noting the frequency of groundwater use
conflicts).
317. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (exploring the ability of property owners to resolve disputes without regulatory
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where many users share the resource and individual activities are difficult
to monitor, ample research suggests they will usually fail.318 Moreover, if
it can establish sustainable pumping regimes, regulation can help ensure
that water remains present to support future farms, residents, and
businesses. Without such intervention, communities-and, in extreme
circumstances, countries-may be difficult to sustain.319
Regulatory intervention also can facilitate social stability in ways that
transcend economics. As Carol Rose has pointed out, collective property
interests sometimes can facilitate interactions that help communities
thrive.12 Water resources exemplify that potential. By providing access to
shared resources like fish and wildlife, means of navigation, places of
gathering, and sometimes, opportunities for solitude and escape,
waterways can play a central role in supporting human communities.
Consequently, many commentators have argued that water resources have
a uniquely public dimension, which traditionally has formed the basis for
legal restrictions on the extent of private exploitation.3 2 Groundwater
directly performs few of these functions, of course; no one goes to the
aquifer to seek companionship or solace. But aquifers play a crucial role in
sustaining the surface waterways that do perform these functions.3 22 If, in
Justice Holmes' often-quoted words, "[a] river is more than an amenity, it
is a treasure," then groundwater quite often is the goose that lays the
golden eggs.323

intervention).
318. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (explaining why groundwater resources are
particularly ill-suited to non-legal management).
319. See Thomas L. Friedman, Without Water, Revolution, N.Y. 7IMES, May 18, 2013, at SRI
(explaining how drought and groundwater overpumping exacerbated Syria's descent into war);
Thomas L. Friedman, Postcard from Yemen, N.Y. 7IMES, May 8, 2013, at A27 (quoting Abdul
Rahman al-Eryani, Yemen's former minister of water and environment: "[W]herever in Yemen you
see aquifers depleting, you have the worst conflicts."). Other stark examples of this phenomenonthough without warfare-come from India, where groundwater depletion presents even greater
challenges than it does in the United States. See Anantha K.H. & K.V. Raju, Groundwater Depletion
and Coping Strategies of Farming Communities in Hard Rock Areas of Southern Peninsular India,
ASIA-PAC. DEv. J., Dec. 2010, at 119, 130, 139-40 (2010) (describing economic dislocation and
human migration, and stating that "[tihe sustainability of communities in rural areas [is] in doubt if the
conditions mentioned above persist for an extended period of time").
320. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
321. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai 'i's Public
Trust Doctrine, 24 U. FLAW. L. REv. 21, 24-25 (2001).
322. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 7 (describing interconnections between surface water and
groundwater).
323. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
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Many places illustrate that value, and some of the best examples lie at
the downgradient fringes of the Edwards Aquifer. There, the aquifer feeds
many springs, and those springs in turn sustain rivers that flow to the Gulf
of Mexico.124 To say that the springs have helped define communities is an
understatement. Archaeological evidence suggests that humans have lived
by the San Marcos Springs, one of the most significant discharge points,
125
for more than 10,000 years. In modern times, they have become a tourist
mecca. For years, kitschy underwater performances, complete with
dancing humans and swimming pigs, drew huge crowds.3 26 More recently,
the pigs have been displaced by more ecologically sensitive forms of
sightseeing.3 27 The downstream rivers are of equal recreational value, with
3 28
large crowds of people floating downstream on typical summer days.
Threatened or endangered species depend upon the aquifer's outflows,
both in the springs themselves and miles downstream, where the rivers
sustain some of North America's most important whooping crane
habitat.3 29 But the springs are under threat. Declining water levels in the
springs were one of the key triggers for the litigation and political
controversies that ultimately led to the creation of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority, and, thus, to Texas's recent spate of groundwater/takings
litigation.330 And if that litigation undermines groundwater use regulation,
the threat will likely emerge again.
CONCLUSION

The coming years probably will bring increased conflict over
groundwater. Scientists expect that climate change will exacerbate stresses
on surface water supplies, leading water users of all types to seek

324. See Votteler, supra note 38, at 261; Edwards Aquifer and the Guadalupe River, GUADALUPEBLANCO RIVER AUTHORITY, http://www.gbra.org/drought/edwardsaquifer.aspx (last visited Dec. 23,
2013).
325. See Joel L. Shiner, Large Springs and Early American Indians, 28 PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST
1, 6 (1983); Votteler, supra note 38, at 273.
326. Gregg Eckhart, San Marcos Springs, THE EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBSITE, http://www
.edwardsaquifer.net/sanmarcos.html (chronicling the springs' colorful history) (last visited Dec. 23,
2013).
327. Id.
328. See Guadalupe River State Park, WILDTEXAS.COM, http://wildtexas.com/texas-parks/
guadalupe-river-state-park (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) ("The Guadalupe River ... is the state's most
heavily utilized recreational river.").
329. See Votteler, supra note 38, at 270-71 ("The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service... considers the
Comal and San Marcos Springs ecosystems to contain one of the greatest known diversities of
organisms of any aquatic ecosystem in the Southwest."); Aransas Project v. Shaw, No. 2:20-CV-075,
2013 WL 943780 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2013) (describing the relationship between flows in the
Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers and whooping crane survival).
330. See Votteler, supra note 21, at 851-53.
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alternative water sources. 331 Development will continue, creating new
demand. And while agricultural demand may remain steady or even
decline, conflicts between agricultural use of water and environmental
protection of aquatic resources show no signs of abating. The underlying
tensions that generated takings litigation in Texas and in many other states
are with us to stay.
One possible response to those challenges is to use constitutional
takings clauses to provide existing groundwater users with greater
protection against regulatory limitation. Already, in courtrooms across the
country, litigants are arguing for that change.

332

It would be a mistake.

Such heightened protection would mark a break from historic practices,
and it lacks any supporting judicial precedent.333 It also lacks any
compelling justification in the theories that undergird our property law.334
That does not mean that takings protection for groundwater rights is
inappropriate. With both land and water, the United States has a long
history of balancing constitutionalized property rights with regulatory
authority, and that balancing act can continue even if courts declare
groundwater rights to be constitutional property. But groundwater should
enjoy no greater level of takings protection than any other form of
property right.

331.

See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 12-14.

332. See supra text accompanying note 210.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 193-212.
334. See supra Part III.

